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Literature Review 
Factors Affecting Juror Decision-Making in Infanticide and Insanity Cases 
I 
Abstract 
Infanticide, the murder of a child aged between 24 hours and 12 months, dates 
back to Ancient Greece, where it was primarily used for population control. It 
still occurs in modem society, although illegally, and is often associated with the 
mother experiencing a postpartum illness (Laporte et al., 2003). In Tasmania, if a 
woman murders her child under the age of 12 months, she may plead guilty to 
the legislated crime of Infanticide. This offers her a lesser charge of 
manslaughter, resulting in a variety of sentencing options including psychiatric 
treatment. In contrast, as American law does not incorporate the Infanticide 
provision, the defendant must prove that she is Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. 
This incorporates a legal, rather than psychiatric, conception of insanity, or 
mental illness (Yannoulidis, 2003). This has led to critics arguing that the 
Infanticide provision is redundant and stereotypes women as being susceptible to 
mental disorders. Further, it is argued that the insanity defence needs to be 
updated to incorporate a psychological definition of insanity as generally 
understood by the public (Osborne, 1997). Whilst it is accepted that juror 
characteristics interplay to affect their decision-making and verdicts rendered, 
there are areas where little information exists as to the effects of specific 
attributes (for example, gender of the juror). Skeem, Louden and Evans (2004) 
argued that the Insanity Defence Attitudes Scale-Revised (IDA-R) can help 
researchers predict jurors' verdicts regarding insanity cases depending on how 
negatively they score on the scale. However, in order to develop a greater 
understanding of what attributes affect juror's verdicts, more fine-grained 
research is required, including exploring infanticide cases and leading to an 
updated insanity defence. 
2 
For the vast majority of the world's population, an idealised, stereotypical 
icon includes a mother holding her newborn baby — an occasion that is to be 
celebrated and enjoyed by the child's family. Entering motherhood can be 
viewed as a rite of passage and achievement. Psychologically 'healthy' women 
often find pregnancy a means of self-realisation or a creative act that gratifies 
both hers, and her partners, needs (Sadock & Sadock, 2007). The stereotypical 
new mother is expected to possess the intrinsic ability to love, nurture and raise 
her own child into adulthood (Dobson & Sales, 2000). However, due to the high 
rate of postpartum illnesses, one in seven mothers will struggle to meet the 
demands this stereotype encompasses (Beyond Blue, 2009). 
The period following childbirth imposes a range of psychological, social 
and physical adjustments on the mother's behalf (Stanton, Lobel, Sears, & 
DeLuca, 2002). Despite the widespread belief that new mothers are joyous, 
psychologically healthy and easily adapt to the parenting role, postpartum mood• 
disorders are a fairly common form of maternal morbidity following the delivery 
of a child. Postpartum affective disorders range in both severity and duration, 
whilst also having a detrimental effect on the woman's life and bonding with her 
newborn child (Dennis & Hodnett, 2007). Spinelli (n.d.) stated that mental illness 
during the postpartum period, primarily affective disorders, falls into one of three 
categories: postpartum blues (also commonly referred to as the 'baby blues'), 
postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis. 
Postpartum illnesses 
Postpartum blues is not considered to be a depression (Spinelli, n.d.). 
Rather, it is described as period of sometimes extreme mood fluctuations, where 
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the mother experiences feelings of elation, followed by depression. Findings 
from Spinelli's research suggest that almost every mother experiences 
postpartum blues. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV- TR) of the 
American Psychiatric Association (2000) reported a 70% incidence rate of 
postpartum blues in new mothers and that this affective turmoil usually lasts for 
10-14 days. While worsening signs should be monitored for indications of 
depression, even severe symptoms usually dissipate without requiring treatment 
or intervention. A mother experiencing postpartum blues will report symptoms 
including feeling overwhelmed, anxious, having difficulty sleeping, as well as 
feelings of elation at one instant and then crying or feeling hopeless the next. 
Whilst postpartum blues might be considered a minimal, or even trivial, affective 
disorder because of its short duration, it can impose significant stresses upon the 
mother, her newborn and other family members due to the emotional 
rollercoaster the mother is experiencing. 
It has been established that pregnancy and early parenthood are times of 
increased risk for developing an emotional disorder (Buist et al., 2006). 
Postpartum depression is a major health problem that affects approximately 10- 
20% of all childbearing women (Spinelli, n.d.). In Tasmania it is estimated that 
one in five mothers are believed to suffer from postpartum depression (Duncan, 
2010). Further, an Australian study conducted by Buist et al. (2005), suggested 
that up to 50% of postpartum depression cases are overlooked primarily due to 
inadequate screening procedures, leaving many new mothers at risk of harm and 
not receiving adequate treatment. Postpartum depression can occur in the first 
four weeks to three months following childbirth. Al-Issa (1980) cited research 
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which indicated that postpartum depression usually peaks in the first few months 
following delivery, rather than later on. 
Reported symptoms of postpartum depression include the mother 
experiencing conflict regarding her maternal role and/or abilities. The mother 
might experience persistent sadness and crying, an inability to sleep even when 
the baby sleeps, over-concern about the baby (including health problems, 
perceived deformities and perceived imminent death of the infant), anxiety and 
an inability to bond with the baby. In rare and more severe cases the mother may 
attempt, and succeed in, suicide or infanticide. The mother can be plagued by 
obsessions and thoughts about hurting the child, but not actually want to cause or 
bring about any harm. 
Postpartum psychosis (sometimes referred to as puerperal psychosis) is 
described as a loss of contact with reality as demonstrated by hallucinations 
(including tactile, visual and olfactory hallucinations) and delusions (false 
beliefs, for example, believing one is God, or is directed by God, or some other 
unseen force) (Spinelli, n.d.). It is usually considered to be affective or 
schizoaffective in nature and is rare, although often highly predictable, occurring 
at a frequency of two-to-four per 1000 deliveries in Australia and New Zealand 
(Barnet & Morgan, 1996). Sadock and Sadock (2007) assert that symptoms of 
postpartum psychosis can begin within days following delivery. However, the 
average time of onset is within two to three weeks, and almost always within 
eight weeks, of childbirth. 
Characteristic symptoms include the mother complaining of fatigue, 
insomnia, restlessness and emotional lability. This is followed by suspiciousness, 
confusion, irrational statements and obsessive concerns regarding the child's 
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health and welfare. Delusions may include that the baby is dead or defective. 
Once psychosis occurs, and it is usually florid in nature, the mother may be a 
danger to herself or her newborn, depending on the content of her delusional 
structure and her degree of agitation (Sadock & Sadock, 2007). Postpartum 
depression may or may not be associated with psychosis. Further, nonpsychotic 
depressed mothers are less likely to be a danger to themselves or their infant 
(Spinelli, 2004). 
Reports of postpartum psychosis and other postpartum illnesses date back 
for more than 2000 years. Hippocrates described it as a madness experienced by 
women after giving birth due to an excessive blood flow to the brain (Spinelli, 
2004). However, despite its long-observed history there is yet no formal 
diagnostic status of postpartum illness in the DSM-IV- TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). Rather, the DSM-IV- TR provides the specifier 'with 
postpartum onset' which can be applied to the current, or most recent, Major 
Depressive, Manic or Mixed episode of Major Depressive Disorder, Bipolar I 
Disorder, Bipolar II Disorder or to Brief Psychotic Disorder. This specifier is 
only to be used if the onset of the above disorders occurs within four weeks after 
childbirth. 
Whilst the DSM- V is currently still under review, it adopts the position that 
the time-frame in which the specifier, 'with postpartum onset,' may be used has 
been extended to the onset of an episode occurring within six months postpartum 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2010). Jones (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2010) provided a memo outlining research to guide the proposed 
changes to the DSM- V. Mainly, that in everyday use postpartum depression is 
used to refer to episodes with onset up to six months following delivery. From 
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this, Jones argued that for unipolar depression, the previous four week time 
frame is too restrictive, but that the previous time frame may be acceptable for 
bipolar episodes. Consequently, the ultimate solution may be too complex 
(providing different specifiers for each disorder), therefore suggesting the criteria 
be extended to episodes with onsets within two to six months of delivery. It 
appears that, at this stage, the American Psychiatric Association is adopting the 
latter timeframe in the DSM- V. 
According to the DSM-IV- TR it is important to distinguish mood disorders 
from postpartum blues. This is due to postpartum blues having transient 
symptoms and not significantly impairing an individual's functioning, compared 
to Mood Disorders. However, it is suggested that postpartum blues increases the 
risk for a Major Depressive Episode with postpartum onset. Due to this, further 
research should be undertaken to aid the development of effective screening 
measures to detect symptoms of mental illness during and after pregnancy before 
symptom severity increases (Buist et al., 2005; Buist et al., 2006). 
The experience of childbirth results in many chemical changes that occur in 
a woman's body. This includes rapid fluctuations in levels of oestrogen, 
progesterone and other gonadal hormones that are produced during parturition, 
but which drop dramatically following birth. These changes trigger central 
nervous system neurotransmitter alterations to aid in the birthing process 
(Spinelli, 2004). Spinelli stated that the results of various research studies 
demonstrate that gonadal steroids impact upon a person's ability to have control 
over their moods. Due to this, researchers have focused on exploring the cause of 
postpartum illnesses by examining the withdrawal effect of the gonadal 
pregnancy hormones. The physiological changes of childbirth begin as some 
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hormone levels, which have increased vastly — sometimes up to 200-fold over the 
course of gestation, decline promptly within 24 hours, which coincides with the 
delivery of the placenta. The placenta has been linked to the source of many 
hormones during pregnancy. The results of Bloch et al.'s (2000) research 
suggested a direct link to support the involvement of the reproductive hormones 
oestrogen and progesterone in the development of postpartum depression. This 
offers a biological explanation as to why childbirth is viewed as a time of 
increased mental disturbance. 
Infanticide 
Force every way will have it they must die, and since this must be so, 
then I, their mother, shall kill them 
(Euripides; quoted by Grene & Lattimore, 1955) 
The murder of one's child, also referred to as filicide, is one of the oldest 
and most widely used means of population control. In Ancient Greece it was an 
accepted practice for eugenic reasons in order to maintain a stronger Grecian 
society by eradicating an ill, deformed or otherwise imperfect baby or child. The 
main accepted practice of committing filicide included exposure whereby the 
newborn was abandoned by roadsides or in fields, and left to die through 
starvation and exposure to the elements (Riechers, 2003). 
The acceptance and number of women engaging in legal infanticide (the 
murder of a child older than 24 hours, but less than 12 months old) persisted as 
late as seventeenth century France. Backhouse (1984) speculates that this 
practice and tolerance of infanticide could be attributed to the ineffectiveness and 
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unavailability of birth control. Instances of infanticide continued to spread 
rapidly. It was most often engaged in by single women who were unable, mainly 
due to economic reasons and societal status repercussions, to look after and raise 
a child on their own. 
During 1680-1800 in England, it is estimated that as many as 25% of 
killings were infanticide. In colonial America by comparison, the estimated 
prevalence was slightly higher at 33% during the same time period (Perlin, 
2003). 'Overlaying' was a common method, involving the mother lying on the 
infant in order to smother the child to death (Hansen, 2004). However, in strong 
reaction to the widespread practice of infanticide, the Catholic Church declared 
that such an act was a mortal sin, and laws and severe secular penalties were 
introduced for its prevention (Spinelli, 2005). 
The first of such laws stated that concealment of a murdered newborn was 
considered a capital offence. One of many available punishments included the 
sentence of 'sacking'. This consisted of the perpetrator being placed in a sack 
with a dog, a rooster and a snake, and then thrown in the river to drown (Spinelli, 
2004). During the eighteenth century there was a high degree of accused women 
being convicted in the English courts. Francus (1997) cites that for 28 infanticide 
cases studied, 20 women were convicted, five were acquitted, one deferred 
judgment and two had unknown verdicts. 
Nineteenth century England saw a change in the approach towards the 
crime of infanticide. The law stated that any mother suspected of killing her 
infant should be tried for murder and, if convicted, should receive the same 
sentence as any other murderer, namely the death penalty. However, in practice 
juries rarely convicted the mother of murder. Furthermore, judges were reluctant 
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to impose the death penalty. It was common practice for the Home Secretary to 
advise substitution with a less severe penalty in many maternal infanticide cases 
(Dobson & Sales, 2000). Rowe (1991) commented that the reluctance to enforce 
the death penalty also persisted in early America. Many women received a lesser 
penalty or were acquitted of all charges. Although infanticide was regarded as a 
serious crime and prosecutors aggressively sought the death penalty, infanticide 
proved difficult to prosecute successfully. 
The reluctance to convict the mother of murder may have been due to the 
view that for the crime of infanticide there is rarely one victim, but rather two — 
the child and the perpetrator. Milner (1998) stated that there is ample evidence to 
support the position that parents under severe and continuing stress can act 
impulsively and without effective cognitive thought, to either hurt or murder 
their children. Perlin's (2003) research suggests that the majority of women who 
killed their infant child were suffering from a postpartum illness. 
In 1922, the English Parliament enacted legal change by introducing the 
Infanticide Act. This stated that any mother who killed her child and who showed 
evidence of mental disturbance or illness at the time of the incident should be 
tried and sentenced as if she had committed manslaughter and not murder. The 
Infanticide Act was revised in 1938 to include that lactation, as well as 
childbirth, can be the mitigating factor of the mother's mental disturbance, 
providing that the victim is less than 12 months of age (Dobson, & Sales, 2000). 
The Infanticide Act 1938 in a sense inadvertently legalised the widely held view 
that any woman who has given birth may have an altered and disturbed mental 
status. This belief tended to be adopted in the British courts at the time the Act 
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was enacted, with judges often drawing parallels to the erratic behaviours of 
female dogs after giving birth (Bartholomew & Bonnici, 1965). 
As to the current legal standing of mothers in Australia, and specifically 
Tasmania, the Criminal Code Act 1924 (referred hereafter as The Criminal Code) 
provides an alternative to a murder charge. The infanticide provision states that: 
'A woman who by any wilful act or omission, causes the death of her 
child (being a child under the age of 12 months), and who was at the 
time not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child, 
and the balance of her mind being; by reason thereof, disturbed, is 
guilty of a crime, which is called infanticide, although the offence 
would, but for this section, have amounted to murder' (s165A). 
The Criminal Code was amended to incorporate the Infanticide Act 1938, which 
gave formal recognition to the commonly held belief that a woman may have an 
altered and disturbed mental status for up to a year following childbirth. 
Neonaticide is a term to describe the killing of a child less than 24 hours 
old. Lee, Li, Kwong and So (2006) state that neonaticide can be distinguished 
from other filicide incidences (including infanticide) by the circumstances of the 
killing, motive and psychosocial background of the mother-infant relationship. 
Further, the denial or deception of pregnancy is a common occurrence that may 
result in an undetected birth. The legal consequences of both neonaticide and 
infanticide are similar; however Lee et al. suggest that it is often difficult to 
conduct systematic clinical and psychosocial research on neonaticide due to the 
secrecy and psychological mindset of the mother. 
Being tried under s165A (and other similar provisions across Australian 
states) offers a lesser charge in contrast to a homicide charge. It also allows for a 
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variety of sentencing options including hospitalisation to receive treatment 
(Wilczynski, 1997). It is also important to note that the mother does not need to 
show that she was legally insane under s165A. Rather, the law assumes that the 
mothers' actions are an acute expression of a mental or emotional problem 
directly associated with childbirth or lactation (Vatz, 2002). 
The Infanticide Act 1938, and other legal statutes incorporating this act 
across various countries including Australia, has evoked controversy particularly 
regarding the 'disturbed' balance of the mother's mind. It is well known that the 
period following childbirth imposes a range of psychological, social and physical 
adjustments. Among the three types of postpartum illnesses, it is said that 
postpartum depression has received the greatest research attention (Stanton et al., 
2002). Postpartum blues, discussed previously, is considered not to constitute a 
depression. The period of mood fluctuations lasts for a relatively short period of 
time and symptoms are usually mild in severity. Due to these factors, it is said 
that postpartum blues is unlikely to play a causative role in infanticide incidents 
(Chandra, Bhargavaraman, Raghunandan, & Shaligram, 2006). 
On the other hand, postpartum depression is regarded as a clinical 
depression that occurs during the weeks and months following childbirth. The 
majority of the postpartum illness and infanticide controversy is said to revolve 
around postpartum depression. Whilst the findings from earlier studies claim to 
have demonstrated that postpartum depression was common among childbearing 
women, more recent research suggests postpartum depression is not qualitatively 
different from depression experienced during other stages of one's life. In a study 
conducted by Kumar and Robson (1984), they reported that there were no 
significant differences in either the symptoms or prevalence when they compared 
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matched samples of childbearing versus non-childbearing women experiencing 
depression. Due to research such as that conducted by Kumar and Robson, 
Dobson and Sales (2000) suggest that there is little convincing evidence that 
postpartum depression is unique and different from other forms of depression. 
Whilst depression can be classified as a mental illness by the DSM-IV- TR and 
has been shown to be present in some women who commit infanticide, d'Orban 
(1979) argued that depression, on its own, is not sufficient to support the 
Infanticide Act 1938 position on the postpartum defence. That is; whilst 
'postpartum depression' can be used to describe a type of depression a woman 
experiences after giving birth, it is not adequate to state that due to this the 
postpartum period is a time of increased mental disturbance and therefore the 
infanticide provision should be available as an alternative to a homicide charge. 
Another reason for questioning the supposed distinctiveness of postpartum 
depression from other types of depression is that the risk factors for postpartum 
and non-postpartum depression are similar. Stanton et al. (2002) assert that the 
risk factors for developing postpartum depression include a history of mood 
disturbance (either before or during pregnancy), a poor marital relationship, low 
social support and stressful life events. These predictors are similar to those 
common in most individuals who have developed depression. While a long-held 
view is that hormonal changes that occur during childbirth precipitate postpartum 
depression (Al-Issa, 1980), there is no strong evidence for this. However, Stanton 
et al. acknowledge that the findings from some research do indicate that 
postpartum onset leads to a different course of depression from that with a non-
postpartum onset. Specifically, mothers with a previous history of mood 
disorders were at an increased risk of non-postpartum depression but not 
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postpartum depression. Likewise, women with postpartum depression with no 
previous history of a mood disorder were at an elevated risk for developing 
future postpartum depression, but not for non-postpartum depression. 
Postpartum psychosis, on the other hand, is rare and usually results in 
hospitalisation due to the severity of symptoms experienced, including loss of 
contact with reality (Barnett & Morgan, 1996). Prabhu, Asokan and Rajeswari's 
(2005) findings from their research regarding prevalence and risk factors 
associated with postpartum psychiatric morbidity, suggest that postpartum 
psychosis is a very severe form of psychiatric illness that is seen two to four 
weeks post-delivery. The onset is accompanied by a wide range of 
psychopathological symptoms. As a result of this, the disturbances are easier to 
detect through investigation and anecdotes from both the mother and other 
family members, compared to postpartum depressive symptoms which tend to 
develop more insidiously in comparison (Rohde, Raic, Varchmin-Schultheib, & 
Mameros, 1998). 
The results from reported research have provided clear scientific evidence 
supporting the link between childbirth and postpartum psychosis, thus supporting 
the Infanticide Act 1938 stance that the postpartum period is a time of increased 
mental disturbance. Kendell, Chalmers and Platz (1987) conducted 
epidemiological research on postpartum psychosis and childbirth. This consisted 
of a population-based study located in Edinburgh, Scotland. The researchers 
cross-linked health service records on all women who had given birth to a child 
during a 12-year period (n= 54 087) to records in the Edinburgh Psychiatric Case 
Register. They found that the average number of admissions that included a 
diagnosis of psychosis decreased slightly during pregnancy. This then spiked in 
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the first three months after childbirth. After these three months, admissions for 
psychosis declined, but remained at an elevated rate for two years following 
childbirth. This finding offers support for the position that the first postpartum 
year is a time of high risk for mental disturbance. However, it only appears to be 
applicable to psychosis or severe mental illnesses that require hospitalisation, and 
not for affective disorders that can usually be treated on an outpatient basis, such 
as depression. Further, it can be argued that the 12 month period outlined by the 
infanticide provision, may need to be extended in cases of postpartum psychosis 
or severe mental illness due to its long duration and slow response to treatment. 
Laporte, Poulin, Marleau, Roy and Webanck's (2003) research findings 
suggest that the infanticide defence tends to be associated more often with cases 
involving postpartum depression rather than postpartum psychosis. This may be 
due to individuals arguing the insanity defence in cases of psychosis. Dobson and 
Sales (2000) suggest that this psychotic state can provide justification for both 
diminished capacity under the Infanticide provision as well as the insanity 
defence, noting that only one defence needs to be available to the defendant. 
In comparison to Australian law, the United States has no such legal 
Infanticide provision. A mother who contributes to the death of her child who is 
less than 12 months of age is prosecuted in the same way as any other perpetrator 
of homicide, and in some American states, faces the death penalty as a result of 
this. The insanity defence is available to the defendant to establish that the 
mother was acting under a diminished capacity at the time of the offence, arguing 
that postpartum illness due to childbirth may have interacted with her mental 
state at the time of the offence. In the majority of cases, women have been 
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successful in doing this, suggesting that the Infanticide provision adopted in 
countries like Australia is redundant. 
Eradicating the infanticide provision also removes the stigma that following 
childbirth all women are susceptible to mental disorders, as well as allowing 
jurors to decide whether the defendant was suffering from a mental illness. As it 
stands, the infanticide provision has been criticized because of its preferential 
treatment of women and because it does not encourage jurors to engage in a case 
by case analysis (Osborne, 1987). That is; if a mother kills her infant who is 
under 12 months of age, the infanticide provision is automatically available to 
the defendant and jurors are not able to ascertain what other factors may have 
contributed to the mother's actions, including her mental state. 
Insanity Defence 
The insanity defence was established in the nineteenth century, following 
the decision of B.R v M'Naghten (1843). To establish a defence on the grounds 
of insanity, it must be clearly demonstrated that at the time of committing the act 
'the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of 
mind, as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did 
know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong'. This is 
incorporated in s16 of The Criminal Code. Insanity, (also known as the absence 
of criminal responsibility), refers to the defendant's mental state at the time the 
offence was committed. There may be different standards according to 
jurisdictions. In Tasmania, to be criminally responsible the person needs to be 
able (at the time of the offence) to understand that what he or she was doing was 
wrong or against the law. This does not include understanding what is 'morally' 
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wrong, only wrong according to the law. The layperson may assume that a severe 
mental illness automatically makes one insane, but this is not the case. Whilst a 
severe mental illness or mental defect can be a prerequisite, the disorder must 
then lead to an inability to meet the legal criteria for either competence to stand 
trial or criminal responsibility (Turvey, 2008). 
Yannoulidis (2003) argues that the insanity defence does not have the same 
scope as the psychiatric conception of mental disorder. Specifically, legal 
insanity may be considered an excuse for one's wrong actions and not a 
diagnosis of the individual's mental status. Further, Morris (1953) argues that the 
defence is 'woolly, semantically confused' and 'psychologically immature 
nonsense' (p. 437). This suggests that the insanity defence is not fulfilling its 
original intended purpose. 
There has been a continual debate about the perceived need to review and 
update the M'Naghten standard of insanity. Attempts to alter the insanity 
defence have been met with little success (Becker, 2003). Despite this, one can 
argue that an update is critical when in 2003, Deanna Laney was found not guilty 
by reason of insanity as she did not know that her act was wrong because 'God' 
directed her actions. In contrast, Andrea Yates (2005) was found to be guilty of 
the murder of her children. This verdict rested on the argument that Andrea 
Yates knew her actions were wrong, as required by the law, as she was being 
directed to act by 'Satan'. This suggests that legal insanity was based upon the 
content of the psychotic hallucinations rather than an objective application of the 
law and what a 'reasonable' person would do under similar circumstances 
(Spinelli, 2005). Alternatively, the law may be perceived as confusing to the 
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common lay person, resulting in ludicrous verdicts as jurors struggle to 
understand complicated information. 
Juries 
No freeman shall be seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or 
outlawed, or in any way destroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor will 
we commit him to prison, excepting by lawful judgment of his peers, or 
by the law of the land 
(Clause 39, Magna Carta 1215; Clause 29, Magna Carta 1225) 
The employment of juries during trials is based on the notion that everyone 
has the right to be judged by their peers. This has its origins from the Magna 
Carta which, among other aspects, was created to guarantee justice for all 
(Aldous, 2001). A person who has been accused of an indictable offence 
(criminal offences heard before a judge and jury in the Supreme Court) is 
entitled to have their innocence or guilt determined by a jury of 12 people. In 
trials by jury, lay persons from the community are required to render a verdict by 
applying correct and intricate legal standards. These standards consist of 
complex information which often becomes difficult for the juror to understand, 
let alone apply to the particular circumstances of the case, and jointly with 11 
other jury members. Due to this, jurors may instead and often do, revert and rely 
on their own sense of what is fair in order to reach a decision and render a 
verdict inconsistent with the law (Lieberman & Sales, 1997). Not only are these 
individuals not following the given legal instructions, but the jurors' lack of 
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understanding impacts upon the defendant's sentence, potential freedom and, 
especially in countries with the death penalty, could end a defendant's life. 
Judges deliver instructions to jurors in an attempt to create a legal structure 
to help guide jurors in their decision-making process. The specific duties of the 
juror and the elements of the charges against a defendant must be conveyed with 
instructions to individuals who tend to have limited, or no, legal background. 
According to Lieberman and Sales (2000), earlier research predominantly 
focused on juror comprehension. Findings from reported research tended to 
indicate that jurors have great difficulty understanding legal instructions, with 
some comprehension rates falling below 65%. This suggests that jurors are 
'making up' their own guidelines to aid their decision making. 
Wheatman and Shaffer (2001) suggest that individuals do not attend to and 
are less inclined to abide by legal instructions, compared to individuals who are 
in a group environment and are asked to reach a group consensus on a verdict. 
To counteract this effect, it is suggested that the comprehensibility of jury 
instructions can be improved by rewording them for clarity and brevity 
(Halverson, Hallahan, Hart, & Rosenthal, 1997). In contrast, Finkel and Handel 
(1989) conducted research in which they asked mock jurors to decide insanity 
cases without any instructions. The researchers determined that these jurors 
made discriminations among cases, and their constructs of insanity were 
relevant, flexible and more complex than the legal constructs of insanity. This 
suggests that a purely legal test is inadequate to capture the essence of insanity as 
understood by the lay person. Such divergent research indicates that the insanity 
defence, as understood by jurors, is lacking in depth and even incorporating 
commonly misunderstood psychological aspects, leading to inconsistent and 
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troubling verdicts. Further, juror instructions add to the complexity of the 
judicial arena, suggesting that simplicity may result in more consistent and 
reliable verdicts. 
A vital aspect of the juror, as well as the judge, is to remain impartial 
throughout the trial in order to give a fair and unbiased verdict (Heilbronn, 
Latimer, Nielsen, Pagone, & Kovacs, 2002). However, personal beliefs can creep 
into the judicial process, affecting the decisions made. These beliefs can include 
attitudes towards the insanity defence and those who are mentally ill. General 
beliefs that the individual holds and may not even be aware of may also have an 
influence. Honess and Charman (2002) argue that juries are more likely to acquit 
if their sympathies with the defendant are easily aroused, or individual jurors 
may put forward strong arguments for acquittal if they hold anti-police views. 
Research demonstrates that people perceive the insanity defence as a 
regular occurrence in the legal system, and that it is abused by defendants in 
order to escape criminal responsibility. In practice, the insanity defence is rarely 
successful with unsuccessful attempts most often receiving a longer 
incarceration (Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, & Thompson, 1984). When the 
defendant successfully pleads insanity, the individual is usually committed to a 
secure mental health facility. According to Turvey (2008), a successful insanity 
plea most often results in a much longer hospitalisation than they would have 
received had they pleaded guilty or been convicted at trial and been incarcerated. 
Attitudes are a key element in understanding, predicting and promoting a 
variety of behaviours. According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1973), an attitude refers 
to a persons' nature to respond either favourably or unfavourably to an object, 
person or event. Skeem, Louden and Evans (2004) developed, refined and cross- 
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validated the Insanity Defence Attitude Revised (IDA-R) scale to aid in 
detection ofjuror biases in the jury selection process. This instrument arose from 
their findings across studies that indicate a public view that the insanity defence 
is an abused legal loophole that frequently allows guilty criminals to escape 
responsibility and punishment. Further, ordinary people overestimate the number 
of perpetrators who enter insanity pleas and are acquitted by reason of insanity. 
These negative attitudes are not only prevalent, but also tend to be inflexible. 
Due to this, if jurors are not adequately screened in the selection process, such 
attitudes and biases can creep into and affect the decision-making process 
resulting in unfair, including lenient or harsher, verdicts. 
Gender of the juror 
In regard to the insanity defence, there has been little research investigating 
the effect of the gender of the juror. A large proportion of available research 
examines and focuses on the effect of the gender of the juror in the context of 
rape cases. To date, a clear pattern of gender differences has not yet been 
identified (Badzinski & Pettus, 1994). Villemur and Hyde's (1983) research 
determined that there was no significant main effect for the gender of the juror in 
a simulated rape trial. However, they discovered that the juror's gender had more 
complex effects in combination with other factors, including the age of the 
victim: female jurors attributed more blame to the defendant when the victim 
was older. 
Wuensch, Chia, Castellow, Chuang and Cheng (1993) investigated, 
amongst other attributes, the gender of the juror and the effect that this had on 
their verdicts for burglary or swindle cases. Their results indicated that female 
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mock-jurors rendered more lenient sentences for female defendants compared to 
male defendants. Further, the attractiveness of male defendants was associated 
with more lenient sentencing in burglary cases. This suggests that many aspects 
of the judicial arena, including the gender of the juror, can sway and influence 
the juror's decision rather than relying solely on the facts presented to them. 
However, the case of a mother killing her child may provoke a more emotional 
response in jurors in contrast to burglary or swindle cases. Due to the societal 
expectation of mothers being caring, nurturing and protective of their children, 
Dunn, Cowan and Downs (2006) suggested that female jurors may react more 
negatively in maternal infanticide cases than male jurors. This may be due to 
factors such as disbelief in the female juror that another woman could take such 
actions to end her child's life. In contrast, Hoiberg and Stires' (1973) research 
determined that, compared to males, female jurors are more derogatory towards 
rape victims. This indicates that further investigation is required before definitive 
conclusions can be drawn. 
When a mother commits infanticide, the jury tends to be predominantly 
female. For example, in Yates v Texas (2005), the jury consisted of eight women 
and four men. Fischer (1997) investigated effect ofjuror's gender, specifically 
whether mock juror's guilty verdicts increased as a function of the number of 
women on the jury in a simulated rape trial. The data indicated that guilty 
verdicts did not increase significantly until either females represented the 
majority (that is; 7:5 female to male ratio) or the jury consisted only of females. 
However, male jurors tend to provide more severe punishments in comparison 
(Kaplan &Miller, 1978). 
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The above literature indicates that the gender of the juror is a somewhat 
'unknown' contributor to the judicial process and the verdicts and sentences 
rendered in a court of law. Kaplan and Miller (1978) assert that the relationship 
between juror gender and proneness to convict is not simple, but can be 
moderated by many other factors. Future research should focus on teasing out 
the effects of juror's gender further in order to aid the understanding of what 
factors contribute to and affect juror's decisions. Such research may also help 
lawyers to be of a benefit to their clients in the jury selection process. 
Single episode versus recurring episodes of mental illness 
As with gender ofjuror, there has been limited research on the effect in the 
court of law of single episode versus recurring episodes of symptoms of mental 
illness. The term 'transient mental illness' (which also refers to a single episode) 
has been coined to refer to mental illnesses whose symptoms seem to be confined 
to a particular place and time due to an ecological niche that permits this 
(O'Neill, 1999). For example, there has been an increase of identified cases of 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), which 
may be due to a number of factors including general awareness in society due the 
spread of media attention, including dramatised portrayals in film adaptations 
such as The Three Faces of Eve (Johnson, 1957). Further, modem Western 
society creates and fosters conditions that increase stress related illnesses, 
including burnout, depression and anxiety (Rubino, Luksyte, Perry, & Volpone, 
2009). 
Research has demonstrated that people's verdicts are influenced by the 
attributions they make based on the defendant's mental health. In general, 
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mental illness comes with stigma attached, with people making more negative 
attributions and assigning greater blameworthiness, responsibility and 
controllability where those suffering mental illness are accused of crimes 
(Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003). Henkel's (2008) 
research also demonstrates the presence of mental illness stigma. In that study, 
participants perceived a defendant as less culpable when they had a medical 
disorder. However, if the defendant was experiencing anxiety problems, he or 
she was not excused in the same way. Jurors may also feel pressured to convict a 
person suffering from a mental illness due to the misconception that these 
individuals are 'ticking time bombs' (Appelbaum, 2004, p. 1105), so that their 
incarceration is seen as necessary for public safety. This may contribute to the 
over-representation of people with mental illness in the criminal justice system 
(Henderson, 2003). 
In regard to the court of law, there may be little reporting of single episodes 
of mental illness symptoms due to verdicts being rendered on a case-by-case 
basis. Further, prior diagnosis of mental illness is not a prerequisite for use of the 
insanity defence, as jurors are directed to focus on the act in question. This may 
explain the limited attention single episodes of mental illness symptoms have 
received within the courts and their minimal effect on juror decision-making, 
which points to a gap or unexplored area, in the research. 
Current state of research and future directions 
Currently a firm understanding exists that juror characteristics impact 
upon the decision-making process and verdict rendered (Lieberman & Sales, 
1997). Substantially less knowledge exists regarding an in-depth understanding 
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of inherent beliefs and values, and the influence of juror attributes specifically 
regarding infanticide and insanity cases. Surprisingly, this lack of research still 
remains despite the occurrence of infanticide and filicide as reported by the 
media (for example: Leanne Azzopardi and Tanya Soutter (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation News, 2004; 2008)). This highlights that further 
attention is needed to explore the possibility of juror characteristics when 
deliberating on infanticide cases incorporating a defendant who was suffering 
from a postpartum illness leading up to, and at the time of the crime. 
There is a high prevalence of diagnosed postpartum illnesses in new 
mothers. It is estimated that many more mothers are undiagnosed and thus go 
untreated leaving both the mother and her child at risk of harm (Buist et al., 
2006). Due to this high prevalence, it is more likely that the courts will be 
hearing more filicide and infanticide cases now and in the future. 
However, controversy exists as to how infanticide should be treated and 
sentenced in a court of law. The Infanticide Act 1938 was enacted to address the 
reluctance of eighteenth century courts to prosecute and sentence new mothers 
who, due to mental illness, had killed their child less than 12 months of age. 
Tasmania, specifically, has adopted the position that the postpartum period is a 
time of increased mental disturbance for up to a year following childbirth by 
incorporating the Infanticide Act 1938 in section 165A of The Criminal Code. 
In contrast to Australian law, American law does not adopt the infanticide 
provision; rather mothers who commit infanticide while suffering from a 
postpartum illness are required to argue that they are not guilty by reason of 
insanity. The insanity defence requires defendants to prove that they were acting 
under such a diminished capacity that they were not able to understand the nature 
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and quality of their act, or that what they were doing was wrong. Morris (1953) 
and many other critics argue that it is time for the insanity defence to be updated 
and adopt a more psychiatric conception of mental illness, which is generally 
understood by the lay person. Yannoulidis (2003) has attempted to meet this 
challenge and redefined the insanity defence. As yet, this updated defence has 
not been tested to determine whether a psychological insanity defence is more 
adaptable and understandable than the existing traditional defence. 
It has been argued that the infanticide provision is not required due to the 
existing insanity defence. Further, d'Orban (1979) assumes the position that 
postpartum depression is not sufficient to support the existence of the infanticide 
provision as it does not qualitatively differ from depression experienced at other 
times during one's life. Further, Kendell et al. (1987) argue that support for the 
view that the 12 month period following childbirth is a time of increased mental 
disturbance in the mother is applicable only to psychosis or severe mental illness 
that results in hospitalisation and not for affective disorders that can be treated on 
an outpatient basis, such as depression. Such a serious mental illness can provide 
justification for diminished capacity under the infanticide provision and the 
insanity defence, suggesting that the infanticide provision is redundant. 
Due to the sensitive nature of infanticide cases, and at times it can be 
considered that there are two victims (the mother and the child) it is imperative to 
conduct further research to ensure the law is adaptable and provides appropriate 
sentencing options to such cases. It is also vital to research juror verdicts and 
compare the two defences to determine if the infanticide defence is actually 
redundant, whether the insanity defence can be used for postpartum illness and 
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providing an insanity defence that incorporates the layperson's understanding 
and the current clinical conception of mental illness. 
There are many aspects of the judicial arena that require further 
investigation in order to gain a greater understanding of juror decision-making. 
Factors of interest include attitudes towards the insanity defence and whether 
these are predictive of the verdict reached, jurors' understanding of the complex 
legal definitions and laws used in the judicial process, the influence of the jurors' 
gender on verdicts and recommended sentences, and whether single episodes of 
symptoms of mental illness affect juror's decisions. Findings from various 
researchers (for example, Corrigan et al., 2003; Villemur, & Hyde, 1983) suggest 
that there are complex interactions involving these factors. Fuller understanding 
of the influence of these factors could have practical application in courts of law, 
including improving the juror deliberating process and aiding them through the 
complex legal tests provided to them. 
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Abstract 
This study examined the effect of juror characteristics when rendering verdicts 
on an infanticide case, as well as investigating the efficaciousness of the 
infanticide provision and insanity defence. 437 participants aged between 17 to 
62 years were asked to complete two questionnaires (Insanity Defence Attitudes-
Revised scale and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale), read a case 
vignette and render individual verdicts regarding the criminal responsibility of 
the defendant in question. The results of this study indicated that a defendant's 
psychological history (either a single episode or recurring) had little influence 
over a mock jurors' decision, however a woman experiencing postpartum 
depression (in contrast to postpartum psychosis) was more likely to be convicted 
of murder. Further, the study attempted to examine whether a revised insanity 
defence proposed by Yannoulidis (2003) would be more effective and easier to 
understand than the traditional insanity defence. The study offers support for the 
revised insanity defence, with this verdict being rendered more often than a 
guilty of murder verdict, compared to the traditional insanity defence. Whilst 
female mock jurors' reported higher levels of sympathy towards the victim and 
defendant compared to males, this did not make a significant impact on their 
decision making. The current study offers preliminary findings as to juror 
characteristics that interplay on the juror decision making process in infanticide 
cases. 
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The period following childbirth imposes a range of psychological, social 
and physical adjustments on the mother's part (Stanton, Lobel, Sears, & DeLuca, 
2002). Spinelli (n.d.) stated that mental illness during the postpartum period, 
primarily affective disorders, falls into three categories: postpartum blues 
(commonly referred to as the 'baby blues'), postpartum depression and 
postpartum psychosis. These postpartum illnesses can negatively influence the 
woman's experience of motherhood and cause her to act in unconceivable ways 
than she normally would. These actions may include child abuse, neglect or even 
causing the child's death. 
The results from Perlin's (2003) research suggest that the majority of 
women who kill their infant child are suffering from a postpartum illness. For 
women who murder their child under 12 months of age, Australian law provides 
an alternative to the murder charge through the Infanticide provision. Whilst this 
provision offers a variety of sentencing options, controversy has arisen regarding 
whether this provision is really needed, or whether women can successfully 
argue a postpartum illness using the insanity defence. 
In addition to the infanticide provision debate, the insanity defence has 
attracted controversy. For the insanity defence specifically, it is argued that the 
current legal precedent does not encapsulate the current understanding of mental 
illness as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4th ed., Text Revision: DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000), or 
the proposed revised version (DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2010). 
However attempts to reformulate a revised defence have met with little success 
(Becker, 2003). 
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Substantial research has been conducted on examining juror biases and 
attitudes when deliberating and rendering verdicts, including jurors' 
comprehension of complex legal instructions. Research has provided mixed 
results as to the juror's ability to deliver a reasonable verdict in line with these 
instructions. It has been suggested that jurors may, and often do, rely upon their 
own sense and intuition as to what they believe is fair in order to reach a decision 
and render a verdict that is often inconsistent with the law (Lieberman & Sales, 
1997). 
Filicide is often used as an overarching term to describe the killing of a 
child by its parents. It is one of the oldest, widely used means of population 
control and still occurred regularly as late as the seventeenth century in France 
(Backhouse, 1984). Although illegal, it still persists in some modern Asian 
communities, to maintain a balance between population growth rates and 
economic resources (Cornell, 1996). 
Infanticide refers specifically to the murder of a child between 24 hours 
and 12 months of age (Friedman & Resnick, 2007). In regard to the legal 
standing of mothers who commit infanticide, the Tasmanian Criminal Code Act 
1924 (referred to hereafter as The Criminal Code) provides an alternative to a 
murder, or manslaughter, charge. This provision states that: 
'A woman who by any willful act or omission, causes the death of her 
child (being a child under the age of 12 months), and who was at the time 
not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child, and the 
balance of her mind being, by reason thereof disturbed, is guilty of a 
crime, which is called infanticide, although the offence would, but for this 
section, have amounted to murder' (Section 165A). 
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This provision was amended to incorporate the Infanticide Act 1938 (Dobson 
& Sales, 2000), which is considered to have given formal, legal recognition to 
the commonly held belief that a woman may have an altered and disturbed 
mental status for up to a year following childbirth (Bartholomew & Bonnici, 
1965). However, being tried under s165A offers a lesser charge compared to 
homicide. It also allows for a variety of sentencing options, including 
hospitalization to receive adequate treatment and continuous follow-ups by 
mental health workers to ensure the mother's mental state is either improving or 
stabilized (Wilczynski, 1997). 
Neonaticide is a term to describe the killing of a child less than 24 hours 
old. Lee, Li, Kwong and So (2006) state that neonaticide can be distinguished 
from other filicide incidences (including infanticide) by the circumstances of the 
killing, motive and the psychosocial background of the mother-infant 
relationship. Further, the denial or deception of pregnancy is a common 
occurrence that may result in an undetected birth. The legal consequences of both 
neonaticide and infanticide are similar; however Lee et al. suggest that it is often 
difficult to conduct systematic clinical and psychosocial research on neonaticide 
due to the secrecy and psychological mindset of the mother. 
Whilst the Infanticide provision offers a lesser charge due to the mediating 
effects of a postpartum illness, whether this provision is still required has 
attracted controversy. It is argued that it provides an 'escape' clause due to 
reinforcing the view that women can become mentally unstable during childbirth 
(Vatz, 2002). The infanticide provision has been criticized due to the preferential 
treatment of women, and that it does not allow a case by case analysis for jurors 
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to determine whether the woman in question is or is not fully recovered from the 
effects of childbirth (Osborne, 1987). 
Mental illness during the postpartum period falls into three categories 
(Spinelli, n.d). Postpartum blues is not considered a depression, but rather a 
period of mood fluctuations that occur in up to 70% of new mothers (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). It usually lasts for a period of 10-14 days and is 
unlikely to play a major causative role in infanticide. Postpartum depression 
affects 10-20% of all childbearing women and is a clinical depression occurring 
during the weeks and months following childbirth. There is little evidence that 
postpartum depression differs qualitatively from depression that occurs at other 
times during one's lifespan (Kumar & Robson, 1984). While, postpartum 
depression is certainly a form of mental illness that has been shown to be present 
in a portion of women who commit infanticide, research on postpartum 
depression does not appear to support the English legal position that the 
postpartum period is a time of increased mental disturbance as stated by the 
infanticide provision (Dobson & Sales, 2000). In contrast, postpartum psychosis 
is relatively rare, but debilitating, usually requiring hospitalization for treatment. 
It is characterized by a loss of contact with reality as demonstrated by 
hallucinations and delusions. Dobson and Sales (2000) assert that this psychotic 
state can both provide justification for diminished capacity under the infanticide 
provision and for the insanity defence. 
In the United States, unlike Australia, there is no legal infanticide 
provision. A mother who commits the act of infanticide is prosecuted in the same 
manner as any other homicide. The insanity defence is available for the 
perpetrator to argue that she was acting under a diminished capacity as a result of 
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the changes (hormonal and other) that occur due to childbirth. Women have been 
successful in using the insanity defence to escape criminal responsibility and 
imprisonment, suggesting that the infanticide provision may be redundant. By 
eradicating the infanticide provision, it removes the stigma that following 
childbirth all women are susceptible to mental disorders and allows jurors the 
opportunity to deliberate as to whether the defendant in question was suffering 
from a mental illness at the time the act was committed. 
The insanity defence was established in the nineteenth century, following 
the landmark decision of B.R v M'Naghten (1843). To ascertain a defence on the 
grounds of insanity, the perpetrator must clearly establish that at the time of 
committing the act (appearing in s16 of The Criminal Code): 
The party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from 
disease of the mind, as to not know the nature and quality of the act he 
was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing 
was wrong' 
Yannoulidis (2003) argues that the insanity defence does not encapsulate 
the same scope as the psychiatric conception of mental disorder. Specifically, 
legal insanity can be considered an excuse for one's wrong actions and not a 
diagnosis of the individuals' mental status. Further, Morris (1953) asserts that the 
insanity defence is 'woolly, semantically confused' and 'psychologically 
immature nonsense' (p. 437). This defence becomes confusing, especially for 
jurors, and fails to incorporate the current psychological understanding of 
'insanity' or rather, mental illness. 
In the legal realm there has been a continual debate about the perceived 
need to review and update the M'Naghten standard of insanity. However, 
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attempts to update and alter the insanity defence have met with little success. 
Despite this, one can still argue that a newer, revised defence is critical in view 
of the following two infanticide cases from America. In 2004, Deanna Laney was 
found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity for the murder of her two children. The 
jurors based their decision on the premise that she did not know that her act was 
wrong because 'God' directed her actions. In contrast, in 2005 Andrea Yates was 
found guilty of the murder of her five children. This verdict was reached on the 
basis that she knew that her actions were wrong because she was directed by 
'Satan' to instigate the murder of her children. This suggests that legal insanity 
was based upon the content of the psychotic hallucinations, rather than an 
understanding of whether the defendants considered their actions were wrong at 
the time offences (Spinelli, 2005). Alternatively, the law may be perceived as 
confusing to the common lay person, resulting in ludicrous verdicts as they 
struggle to understand complicated information. 
Research demonstrates that people incorrectly perceive the insanity 
defence as occurring frequently in the legal system, and are of the belief that the 
insanity defence is abused by defendants as a means to escape criminal 
responsibility. Skeem, Louden and Evans (2004), argue that since these 
perceptions are prevalent and predominantly negative in society, it is an 
important consideration for jury selection. Data obtained using the revised 
Insanity Defence Attitudes scale (IDA-R) suggests that an individual's attitude 
towards insanity consists of their orientation towards strict liability and concern 
regarding perceived injustice and danger. The IDA-R also has predictive value, 
in that scores obtained on the scale are reflective of the participants' ratings of 
insanity. That is, individuals who demonstrated strong negative attitudes towards 
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the insanity defence, as measured by the IDA-R, were less likely to agree that the 
perpetrator was legally insane at the time the offence was committed compared 
to individuals who did not have a negative attitude. 
In trials by jury, lay persons from the community are required to reach a 
verdict by applying correct and complex legal standards. Due to this complex 
information, jurors may often rely on their own sense of what is fair to reach 
their decision. This often results in the jurors rendering a verdict that is 
inconsistent with the law (Lieberman & Sales, 1997). Wheatman and Shaffer 
(2001) suggest that, compared to a group situation, individuals do not attend to 
and are less inclined to abide by legal instructions. To counteract this, it is 
suggested that the comprehensibility ofjury instructions can be improved by 
rewording them for clarity and brevity (Halverson, Hallahan, Hart, & Rosenthal, 
1997). Finkel and Handel (1989) asked mock jurors to decide insanity cases 
without providing any instructions. They determined that these jurors made 
discriminations among cases, and their constructs of insanity were relevant, 
flexible and more complex than the legal constructs of insanity. This research 
suggested that the legal test does not adequately capture the essence of insanity 
as understood by the lay person. The study reported here attempts to reformulate 
the existing insanity defence, incorporating a psychological approach to mental 
illness, based on a revised defence put forward previously by Yannoulidis 
(2003). It also attempted to compare the effects of providing the legal insanity 
test, either without further instruction or with a step-by-step process to determine 
insanity. 
In regard to the gender of the juror, a clear pattern has not yet been 
identified. When a mother commits infanticide and is charged with homicide, 
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juries tend to be predominately female, for example in Yates v Texas, the jury 
consisted of 8 women and 4 men. Due to the perceived loving and nurturing 
mother stereotypes, Dunn, Cowan and Downs, (2006) propose that female jurors 
may react more negatively towards a mother killing her child, compared to male 
jurors. The findings reported in published literature tend to indicate that the 
gender of the juror is a somewhat 'unknown' contributor to the judicial process. 
Kaplan and Miller (1978) assert that the relationship between juror gender and 
proneness to convict is not simple, but can be moderated by many other factors. 
Future research should focus on teasing out the effects of jurors' gender in order 
to aid the understanding of what affects juror's decision making. 
As with gender of juror, there has been limited research on the effect of a 
single episode versus recurring episodes involving symptoms of mental illness. 
The term 'transient mental illness'(also referring to a single episode) has been 
coined to refer to mental illnesses whose symptoms seem to be confined to a 
particular place and time due to an ecological niche that permits this (O'Neill, 
1999). For example, there has been an increase of identified cases of Dissociative 
Identity Disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), which may be due 
to a number of factors including general awareness in society from media 
attention, including dramatised film portrayals such as The Three Faces of Eve 
(Johnson, 1957). Further, modem Western society creates and fosters conditions 
that increase stress related illnesses, including burnout, depression and anxiety 
(Rubino, Luksyte, Perry, & Volpone, 2009). 
Research has demonstrated that people's verdicts are influenced by the 
attributions they make based on the defendant's mental health. In general, 
mental illness comes with stigma attached, with people making more negative 
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attributions and assigning greater blameworthiness, responsibility and 
controllability where those suffering from a mental illness are accused of crimes 
(Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003). Jurors may also feel 
pressured to convict a person suffering from a mental illness due to the 
misconception that these individuals are 'ticking time bombs' (Appelbaum, 
2004, p. 1105), so that their incarceration is seen as necessary for public safety. 
This in turn, may contribute to the over-representation of people with mental 
illness in the criminal justice system (Henderson, 2003). This line of argument 
may suggest that individuals with a history of mental illness are more likely to be 
successfully prosecuted, compared to individuals experiencing their first 
symptoms of a mental illness (Corrigan et al., 2003). In regard to the court of 
law, there may be little reporting of single episodes of mental illness symptoms 
due to verdicts being rendered on a case-by-case basis. Further, prior diagnosis of 
mental illness is not a prerequisite for use of the insanity defence, as jurors are 
directed to focus on the act in question. This may explain the limited research 
attention that transient mental illness symptoms have received within the courts 
and their effect on juror decision-making. 
The aim of the present study was to build upon the emerging literature 
investigating the insanity defence and the infanticide provision, including the 
effects of individual juror attributes. Specifically, this study used vignettes to 
examine mock jurors' judgments of responsibility in regard to mothers who 
commit infanticide. In addition, the study investigated the impact of providing a 
brief summary of judges' instructions of the legal precedents that took the mock 
juror through a step-by-step process (brief legal instructions) in order to reach a 
verdict on the mock jurors' decision-making process, as well as various other 
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attributes: gender of the juror, jurors' attitudes regarding the insanity defence, 
social desirability and jurors' confidence in their verdict. 
In relation to the insanity defence, two types of insanity defences were 
utilized. These included the traditional M'Naghten rules as incorporated in s16 of 
The Criminal Code, and the restructured, psychologically-based definition of 
insanity developed by Yannoulidis (2003). This reconstructed insanity defence 
was under empirical investigation for the first time, and it was not known if the 
reformulated defence would be preferred to the traditional insanity defence. As a 
result, it would have been possible to hypothesise that the frequencies of 
participants rendering verdicts that accepted a reformulated insanity defence 
would be similar to those rendering verdicts that accepted a traditional insanity 
defence. On the other hand, it could be argued that participants would report 
higher confidence when using the psychology-related insanity defence in 
conjunction with legal instructions in the form of a step-by-step analysis of the 
provided law. In regard to the infanticide provision, mock jurors may indicate 
greater confidence in their verdict when using this provision on the basis that it 
adequately encapsulates the current position of the mother in terms of not 
recovering from the full effects of birth. 
Prior research (e.g. Stanton et al., 2002) has indicated that postpartum 
depression does not meet the criteria for the Infanticide provision, mainly 
because it can be characterized as a depression similar to what can occur at any 
stage in one's life. Despite this, it is argued that the hormonal changes that 
coincide with pregnancy are influential in the development of postpartum 
depression. If the former view is held by the general population, it can be 
hypothesized that mothers diagnosed with, or experiencing symptoms of, 
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postpartum psychosis will be perceived more as meeting the criteria for the 
infanticide provision and insanity defence, compared to mothers experiencing 
postpartum depression. Further, mothers with a history of either depression or 
psychosis, as opposed to a single episode or occurrence of a postpartum mood 
disorder, will be more likely to receive an insanity or infanticide verdict (as 
opposed to a Murder verdict), due to their past mental health history. 
In regard to juror attributes, it was hypothesized that mock-jurors' 
attitudes towards the insanity defence would predict their verdict (Skeem et al., 
2005). That is, jurors demonstrating strong attitudes against the insanity defence 
would be more likely to render a Murder verdict than jurors who do not hold this 
opposing attitude. It was hypothesized that the gender of the juror would 
influence verdicts, but two alternate lines of prediction could apply, namely that 
female mock jurors would react more negatively towards the vignettes compared 
to male mock jurors, or conversely that female jurors would sympathise more 
than males with the defendant, understanding better the turmoil associated with 
childbirth. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 437 participants took part in the study. The data from four 
participants were excluded from subsequent analysis due to substantial missing 
information. This resulted in data from 434 participants being used (333 females 
and 101 males). Participants were recruited through undergraduate psychology 
classes in conjunction with advertisements posted on campus at the University of 
Tasmania (UTAS) and on the UTAS School of Psychology website. 
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Participants ranged in age from 17 to 62 years (Mean Age = 23.65 years, 
SD= 8.29). The mean age of female participants was 23.53 years (SD = 8.17), 
while the mean age for the male participants was 24.02years (SD = 8.71). There 
was no significant difference between the mean ages of male and female 
participants F (1, 432) = .265, p = .61. There were no exclusion criteria to 
participate in the study. 
Materials 
Two self-report questionnaires were used, the Insanity Defence Attitudes-
Revised Scale (IDA-R; Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004) and the Social 
Desirability Scale (M-C SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). In addition to these 
scales, systematically varied vignettes were used, coupled with the presence or 
absence of judicial instructions. A post-questionnaire scale was administered to 
assess the participants' belief as to whether postpartum illnesses (depression and 
psychosis) are legitimate illnesses. 
The IDA-R is a self-report 19-item questionnaire used to assess an 
individual's attitude toward the insanity defence. The IDA-R incorporates two 
dimensions. The first dimension, consisting of 9 items, is Strict Liability. This 
refers to the extent to which prospective jurors believe that mental illness reduces 
an individual's capacity for rational decision-making and control, and that 
reduced capacity is relevant to the issue of criminal responsibility. The second 
dimension is Injustice and Danger, consisting of 10 items. This reflects the extent 
to which prospective jurors believe the insanity defence is misused, perhaps with 
the effect of jeopardising public safety. 
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By constructing the IDA-R, Skeem et al.'s (2004) aim was to design and 
develop an understanding of core dimensions of contemporary attitudes towards 
the insanity defence, and to validate a measure of these dimensions. This was to 
improve the precision of future research on jurors' decisional processes in 
insanity cases and to aid legal professionals in identifying impartial jurors at voir 
dire. The development and validation process included choosing items that were 
representative of pre-existing insanity attitude measures (Hans, 1986; Roberts, 
Golding, & Fincham, 1987). Their results indicate adequate psychometric 
properties (Strict Liability, a = .68; Injustice and Danger, a = .88), particularly 
given that these were short (9-10 item) scales. In regard to convergent and 
divergent validity, Skeem et al. compared the !DA-R to other legal attitudes 
scales and found moderate to strong correlations with similar scales 
The IDA-R was also deemed to be strongly predictive of mock juror s' 
insanity case judgments (Skeem & Golding, 2001). Predictive utility generalises 
across geographic jurisdictions and manipulation of case facts. However, the 
IDA-R has not been used in any published research since it was developed, and 
as a result has not been used as a research instrument in a non-American 
population. 
The M-C SDS is a 33-item, true-false, self-report questionnaire that 
measures an individual's need to 'obtain approval by responding in a culturally 
appropriate and acceptable manner' (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960, p. 353). The M-
C SDS items are targeted for behaviours that are socially desirable but unlikely 
to occur. The scale is internally consistent and predicts individuals' tendency to 
describe unpleasant tasks in favourable terms (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; 
Marlowe & Crowne, 1961). 
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Crowne and Marlowe (1960) found the internal consistency of the 33 
items to be .88, and the test-retest correlation was .89. Other researchers have 
also examined the psychometric properties of the M-C SDS, with results 
indicating that the internal consistency of this scale is adequate. Nordholm 
(1974) generated a coefficient of .73, Crino, Svoboda, Rubenfeld, and White 
(1983) generated coefficients that ranged from .70 - .77, Tanaka-Matsumi and 
Kameoka (1986) generated a coefficient of .79, and Holden and Fekken (1989) 
generated a coefficient of .78. 
Vignettes were developed and provided as 'cases' for mock jurors to 
make a verdict judgment and record their responses to the case provided. These 
vignettes contained the same core information, namely a mother smothering her 
infant, but differed in regard to mental status (postpartum depression or 
postpartum psychosis) and mental health history (either no history (single 
episode) or a previous history (recurring)). The cases were largely adapted from 
Yates v Texas (2005) and through reports in published research. All participants 
were provided with the same vignettes, however half of the participants received 
step-by-step instructions that were aimed to take them through the law provided. 
Each vignette contained a different legal test (infanticide, legal insanity, or the 
reformulated psychological insanity defence). 
Participants were asked to render a verdict (Guilty of Murder, Not Guilty 
or a verdict relevant to the legal test provided). Participants were then able to rate 
their level of confidence in their verdict using a 10-point Likert scale, with a 
rating of 1 = not confident, 5 = Neutral and 10 = extremely confident. A post-
experimental questionnaire was also administered. This consisted of five 
questions asking the participant to rate their level of sympathy for the defendant 
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and the victim, as well as their level of knowledge about postpartum illness and 
whether they considered postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis to be a 
legitimate illness. Each question was rated on a 10-point Likert-format scale. The 
vignettes and scales can be viewed in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
Participants responded to research advertisements by email. Upon 
registering their interest participants were provided with a questionnaire package, 
either by email or provided with directions to a place in the UTAS School of 
Psychology department, where questionnaire packages could be collected. The 
questionnaire package included an information sheet (see Appendix B), and 
completion of the questionnaires was taken as consent to participate. 
Participants were asked to complete the questionnaires independently and 
were not required to record any identifying information other than age, gender 
and how many children they had in their household (see Appendix A). They were 
asked to return the completed questionnaires either by email or by leaving them 
in a secure box located in the School of Psychology office to maintain 
confidentiality. A total of three questionnaires were returned by email (and upon 
receipt the questionnaire was printed and the original email deleted to maintain 
confidentiality). The remaining questionnaires were returned by posting them in 
the above secured box. 
Design 
The present study aimed to investigate the efficacy of the insanity and 
infanticide defence, including a revised psychology-related insanity defence, and 
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to examine what juror characteristics influence decision-making and verdicts 
when presented with an infanticide case. The design of the experiment 
incorporated a 2 [mental status: postpartum psychosis, postpartum depression] x 
3 [legal defence: Infanticide, Insanity, Revised Insanity] x 2 [instructions: legal 
test alone, legal test with step-by-step instructions] x 2 [mental illness history: 
transient, recurring] x 2 [juror gender: male, female] between subjects factorial 
design. The dependent variables were participants' scores on the IDA-R, verdicts 
rendered, confidence ratings and their perceived level of knowledge regarding 
postpartum illnesses and whether postpartum illnesses constitute a 'legitimate' 
mental illness. 
Results 
The data obtained from the questionnaire packages were scored according 
to the instructions provided by the instruments and analysed. All relevant output 
for the following analyses can be located in Appendix C. 
The mean number of participants in each condition is 18, with a range of 
16 to 23. There was a fairly even spread (3.7% - 5.3%) of participants within 
each of the 24 conditions. A more detailed graph can be located in Appendix D. 
From the demographic information collected from the questionnaire packages, 
45.5% of participants reported living with at least one child (M= 1, SD= 1.15) 
and 99.53% reported spending at least one hour per week with children (M= 
3.48 hours, SD= 2.01). Of those who participated, 1.15% had served on a jury 
before, whilst 18.89% had experienced the death of their own child under the age 
of 7 in the past five years, or the child of a close friend or relative. A more 
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detailed representation of the sample can be viewed in the Tables located in 
Appendix D. 
Scoring Procedure: IDA -R 
Completed IDA-R questionnaires were entered into a data file. Scores 
were derived for the Total scale, as well as the Strict Liability, and Injustice and 
Danger dimensions. Raw scores ranged from 37 -78 (M= 58.32, SD= 7.52) for 
the total score, 12-44 (M= 28.00, SD= 5.77) for the Injustice and Danger 
dimension and 20-41 (M= 30.32, SD =3.30) for the Strict Liability dimension. 
For all of the above scales, higher scores indicate more negative attitudes to the 
insanity defence. 
Scoring Procedure: M-C SDS 
Completed M-C SDS questionnaires were scored according to the 
procedure developed by Crowne and Marlowe (1960). Using the scoring 
template, participants' scores were calculated by summing the scores for the 
relevant items. Raw scores ranged from 3 to 32 (M= 15.51, SD= 5.40). Higher 
scores reveal a greater level of social desirability, indicating that higher scorers 
tended more to deny that they would engage in activities generally deemed 
socially unacceptable, and would be more likely to portray their own behaviour 
in an unrealistically favourable light. 
Factor Analysis: IDA -R 
To investigate the underlying structure of the IDA-R and compare it with 
the factor structure obtained by Skeem et al (2004), data collected from 434 
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participants were subjected to principal axis factoring with varimax rotation. 
Whilst Skeem et al.'s original research employed a principal components 
analysis, Field (2005) asserts that both methods yield similar results. 
Two factors (with Eigenvalues exceeding 1) were identified as underlying 
the 19 questionnaire items. In total, these factors account for 40.79% of the 
variance in the questionnaire data. The rotated component solution appears in 
Table 1, alongside the results of Skeem et al for comparison. As shown, the 
present results are comparable to those in the American sample, and support the 
assertion that the IDA -R possesses a two factor structure: Strict Liability, and 
Injustice and Danger. 
Gender Differences 
A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to 
investigate the impact that gender had on the scores obtained on the M-C SDS 
and the IDA-R including the total score and scores on the Injustice and Danger, 
and Strict Liability dimensions. There was a significant effect for the M-C SDS, 
indicating that females scored significantly higher (M= 15.91, SD = 5.45) on 
social desirability than males (M= 14.20, SD = 5.00): F (1, 432) = 7.95, p < .01. 
No significant effects for gender were obtained for the IDA-R Total: F (1, 432) = 
.16,p = .69, Injustice and Danger: F (1, 432) = .02,p = .88, or Strict Liability: F 
(1,432) = .41,p = .52 scores. 
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Table I 
Internal Structure of the IDA-R: Skeem et at (2005) and Current Study 
Item 
19 	With slick attorneys and a sad story, any criminal can use 
the insanity defence to finagle his way to freedom 
12 	Perfectly sane killers can get away with their crimes by 
hiring high-priced lawyers and experts who misuse the 
insanity defence 
10 	As a last resort, defence attorneys will encourage their 
clients to act strangely and lie through their teeth to appear 
'insane' 
13 	The insanity defence plea is a loophole in the law that 
allows too many guilty people to escape punishment 
2 For the right price, psychiatrists will probably manufacture a 
'mental illness' for any criminal to convince the jury that he 
is insane 
6 	The insanity defence threatens public safety by telling 
criminals that they can get away with a crime if they come 
up with a good story about why they did it 
8 	The insanity defence returns disturbed, dangerous people to 
the streets 
18 	Many of the crazy criminals that psychiatrists see fit to 
return to the streets go on to kill again 
16 	Most defendants who use the insanity defence are truly 
mentally ill, not fakers 
17 	Some people with severe mental illness are out of touch 
with reality and do not understand that their acts are wrong. 
These people cannot be blamed and do not deserve to be 
punished 
14 	We should punish people who commit criminal acts, 
regardless of their degree of mental disturbance 
1 	I believe that people should be held responsible for their 
actions no matter what their mental condition 
11 	A defendant's degree of insanity is irrelevant: if he commits 
the crime, then he should do the time 
3 	I believe that we should punish a person for a criminal act 
only if he understood the act as evil and then freely chose to 
do it 
15 	It is wrong to punish people who commit crime for crazy 
reasons while gripped by uncontrollable hallucinations or 
delusions 
9 	Mentally ill defendants who plead insanity have failed to 
exert enough willpower to behave properly like the rest of 
us. So, they should be punished for their crimes like 
everyone else 
5 	It is wrong to punish someone for an act they commit 
because of any uncontrollable illness, whether it be epilepsy 
or mental illness 
4 	I believe that all human beings know what they are doing 
and have the power to control themselves 
7 	[believe that mental illness can impair people's ability to 
make logical choices and control themselves 
Variance accounted for 
Skeem et al (2005) Present Study 
Component Component 
Injustice 	Strict 
Liability 
Danger 
Injustice 	Strict 
& 	Liability 
Danger 
.82 .19 .75 .11 
.82 .17 .75 -.05 
.80 0 .72 .00 
.79 .35 .70 .27 
.72 0 .53 .16 
.71 .39 .60 .29 
.64 .44 .62 .32 
.52 .26 .47 .22 
-.49 -.25 -.37 -.15 
0 -.79 -.09 -.63 
.42 .77 .18 .75 
.29 .74 .18 .66 
.43 .71 .38 .72 
0 -.69 -.06 -.38 
0 -.69 -.13 -.56 
.36 .69 .35 .66 
-.11 -.62 -.09 -.50 
.30 .59 .15 .52 
-.19 -.40 -.03 -.40 
27% 27% 33% 13% 
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Factors Associated with Verdict Judgment 
Verdict data was analysed using a loglinear analysis to study the 
relationships between multifactorial categorical variables and to assess how 
effectively the total data could be mapped onto a particular subset of all the 
possible main and interaction effects in the overall design, thus revealing the 
simplest subset of factors which could adequately account for the data. To 
explore the associations between variables, a saturated loglinear model was first 
entered (postpartum illness, psychological history, instructions, law and IDA-R 
scores, together with the dependent variable of verdict rendered). Interactions 
were then eliminated in downward hierarchical fashion, if their contribution to 
accounting for the data proved non-significant. Participant gender was not 
included in this analysis because male participants were far fewer than females. 
For IDA-R scores, a median split on the total score was used to divide 
participants into high and low groups. In regard to verdict, Guilty of Infanticide, 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
(psychological insanity) were coded as Other, so that there were three 
alternatives: Murder, Not Guilty and Other. This was because, although 
participants received different judicial instructions, the three Other verdicts were 
functionally equivalent within the overall log-linear design and differences could 
be followed up after significant effects were obtained. 
The log-linear analysis indicated that all higher order effects, other than 
two-way effects (x2 (135) = 207.49, p<.001), were eliminated as the results 
indicated that they did not contribute to significantly fit with the data. Further, as 
this specific analysis was conducted to assess contributors to verdict, any 
significant effects that did not involve verdict are not discussed here. 
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Law and IDA-R model 
The loglinear model tested for participant's verdicts in relation to the 
legal test they were provided with and their IDA-R scores (high or low) was 
significant, x2  (4) = 14.78, p<.01. Chi-square tests on the IDA-R and verdict were 
performed separately for each level of legal instructions. This revealed a 
significant association between IDA-R scores and verdict for the reformed 
Psychological Insanity alternative, 2C2 (I) = 12.19, p <.001. This association was 
not evident for Infanticide or the traditional Insanity Defence. The participants 
who were high scorers on the IDA-R were significantly more likely to render a 
Murder verdict, than an NGRI, where this was the opposite for low IDA-R 
scorers, who chose to render a NGR1 verdict rather than Murder. Not Guilty 
verdicts were not rendered by either high or low scorers. This interaction is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of high and low IDA-R scorers rendering verdicts in the 
reformulated insanity condition. 
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Illness and verdict model 
The loglinear model tested for verdicts in relation to the defendant's 
diagnosis (postpartum depression or psychosis) was significant, x2 (2) = 20.89, 
p<.001. For both of the postpartum illnesses, the frequency of Not Guilty 
verdicts was found to be similar. A defendant experiencing post-partum 
depression was more likely to receive a Guilty of Murder verdict. In comparison, 
there was little difference in the verdicts rendered when participants received a 
post-partum psychosis scenario. Rather, there was a higher usage of the 
Infanticide and NGRI (both traditional and psychological) compared to post-
partum depression. This interaction is depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of participants' verdicts rendered across the postpartum 
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Instructions and verdict model 
The loglinear model tested for verdicts in relation to whether or not 
participants received step-by-step instructions was significant, x 2 (2) = 7.06, 
p<.05. Participants who did not receive step-by-step instructions were more 
inclined to render a Guilty of Murder verdict, followed by a Guilty of Infanticide 
verdict compared to those who did receive instructions. This interaction can be 
viewed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of participants' verdicts rendered when provided, or not 
provided, with instructions. 
Psychological History, Legal Test and Verdict 
Chi-square tests were conducted to assess the relationship between the 
defendant's psychological history (transient or recurring) and the legal test 
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participant's were provided with (Infanticide, Insanity or Psychological Insanity). 
The chi-square tests revealed that for a transient history of mental illness, there 
was a significant association between the legal test and the verdict rendered, x2 
(8) = 261.09, p<.001; this was also true for a recurring history, x2 (8) =310.83, 
p<.001. 
The frequencies indicate that participants who received the Infanticide 
alternative were more likely to render a Guilty of Infanticide verdict than a 
Guilty of Murder or Not Guilty verdict, regardless of the defendant's 
psychological history. For the psychological Insanity defence, participants 
rendered a Not Guilty by reason of Insanity verdict more often in the transient 
condition compared to the recurring, preferring a Guilty of Murder verdict in the 
latter. In regard to the traditional legal Insanity defence, participants were more 
likely to render a murder verdict in the transient condition, but a Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity in the recurring condition. Cell percentages of this three-way 
model are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Percentage of Participants' Verdicts for the Transient or Recurring 
Psychological History Condition 
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Verdict 
History Law Infanticide Insanity Insanity Murder Not Total 
(psych) Guilty 
Transient Infanticide 70 - 23 7 100 
Insanity 42 - 55 3 100 
Insanity 60 40 0 100 
(psych) 
Recurring Infanticide 88 - 5 7 100 
Insanity 48 - 52 0 100 
Insanity 51 48 1 100 
(psych) 
Psychological History, IDA-R scores and Verdict 
" 	Chi-square analyses were performed to examine verdicts in relation to the 
defendant's psychological history and IDA-R scores. This analysis demonstrated 
a significant interactive association with participants' verdicts in the transient 
condition, z2 (4) = 11.34, p<.05, but not for the recurring condition. 
In the Transient condition, it can be seen from Figure 4 that High IDA-R 
scorers were more likely to render a verdict of either Infanticide or Murder (both 
guilty verdicts). In contrast, whilst Low scorers were more likely to render these 
guilty verdicts, there was a higher usage of both of the insanity defences 
compared to High scorers. 
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Guilty of 	NGRI (psych) 	NGR1 	Guilty of 	Not Guilty 
Infanticide (traditional) 	Murder 
Verdict 
Figure 4. Percentage of participants classified as high or low scorers on the IDA-
R and their verdicts rendered. 
Legal Test and Verdict 
As the above analyses combined a Guilty of Infanticide and NGRI 
(traditional and reformulated) into the one variable (named Other), a chi-square 
analysis was conducted that separated these verdicts, as well as combining the 
Not Guilty and Guilty of Murder verdict. This analysis was highly significant, 
2 (8) = 565.26, p<.001. The data can be viewed in Table 3, and demonstrates 
that in the Infanticide condition, participants rendered a Guilty of Infanticide 
verdict 80% of the time compared to a Guilty of Murder or Not Guilty Verdict. 
When presented with the traditional Insanity test, participants were more likely to 
render a Guilty of Murder verdict than a NGRI verdict. When providing 
participants with the reformulated, psychological Insanity defence, participants 
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chose a NGRI verdict slightly more (54%) than a Guilty of Murder verdict 
(46%). A Not Guilty verdict was not chosen in this condition. 
Table 3 
Number and Percentage of Verdicts Rendered by Participants across the Legal 
Test Conditions 
Verdict 
N(%) 
Condition Infanticide Insanity Insanity 
(Psych) 
Murder Not 
Guilty 
Total 
Infanticide 109 (80) - 19 (13) 10 (7) 138 (100) 
Insanity 69 (47) - 75 (51) 3 (2) 147 (100) 
(Traditional) 
Insanity 80 (54) 68 (46) 0 148 (100) 
(Psychological) 
Total 109 69 80 162 13 433 
No other significant interactions or effects were determined in the loglinear 
analysis. 
The Effect of Gender on Verdict 
Data pertaining to gender was analysed separately, using chi-square 
analyses, due to the high proportion of female participants. 
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IDA-R Scores x Verdict 
Breaking the data down by gender, there was a significant association 
between scores on the IDA-R and verdicts rendered for females, x2 (4) = 11.06, 
p<.05. A non-significant trend occurred in males, x2  (4) = 8.19, p=.08. Due to the 
higher number of participants in the low IDA-R group, group percentages have 
been used to discuss the interaction. The association for females can be viewed in 
Figure 5. This depicts that, while high and low IDA-R scorers rendered a high 
frequency of Guilty of Murder verdicts; low IDA-R scorers had a higher 
frequency of NGRI (both defences) than high IDA-R scorers. A similar, but non-
significant, trend was also found in males. 
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Illness x Verdict 
There was determined to be a significant association between the post-
partum illness experienced by the defendant and the verdict rendered for females, 
z2 (4) = 23.84, p<.00I, but not for males, x2 (4) = .85,p.93. The association for 
females can be viewed in Figure 6. This demonstrates that women were 
significantly more likely to render a Guilty of Murder verdict if the defendant 
was experiencing post-partum depression more often compared to the other 
verdicts and when the defendant was experience postpartum psychosis. In 
contrast, when the defendant was experiencing postpartum psychosis, there was 
no discernible difference between the frequencies of all the verdicts rendered, 
excluding the Not Guilty verdict. 
Guilty of 	NGRI 	NGRI 	Guilty of 	Not Guilty 
Infanticide 	(psych) 	(traditional) 	Murder 
Verdict 
Figure 6. Percentage of female participants' verdicts rendered across the 
postpartum illness conditions 
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No other significant effects were determined for the effect of the participant's 
gender on their verdict. 
Confidence x verdict 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA demonstrated that there was no 
significant difference between the mean confidence ratings in relation to the 
verdict rendered, F (4, 428) = 1.48, p = .208. The mean confidence ratings for 
each verdict can be viewed in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Number of Participants, Means and Standard Deviations of Confidence Ratings 
for Each of the Five Verdicts Rendered 
N M SD 
Infanticide 109 6.83 1.87 
Reformulated Insanity 80 6.44 2.07 
Insanity 69 6.35 1.83 
Murder 162 6.83 2.01 
Not Guilty 13 6.08 2.18 
Total 433 6.66 1.97 
Juror instruction and confidence ratings 
A two-way mixed subjects ANOVA demonstrated that there were no 
significant differences between confidence ratings for participations who 
received step-by-step judicial instructions (M= 6.71, SD = 2.00) and those who 
did not (M= 6.60, SD = 1.93): F (1, 431) = .35,p = .557. 
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
In summary, this data from the post-experimental questionnaire indicates 
(using sample means) that participants held a neutral level of sympathy towards 
the defendant (M= 5.73, SD = 2.34), but were extremely sympathetic towards 
the victim (M= 9.01, SD = 1.61). Participants knew some information regarding 
postpartum illnesses (M= 4.86, SD = 2.44) and generally thought that 
postpartum depression (M= 7.07, SD = 2.21) and postpartum psychosis (M= 
6.57, SD = 2.00) were legitimate illnesses. 
To assess the size and direction of the linear relationship between 
sympathy towards the defendant and victim, jurors' self-reported level of 
knowledge regarding postpartum illnesses, and whether jurors consider 
postpartum depression and psychosis to be legitimate illnesses, bivariate 
Pearson's product-movement correlations coefficient (r) were calculated. The 
results can be viewed in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Correlations between Items on the Post-experimental Questionnaire 
Sympathy 
Towards 
Victim 
Knowledge Depression 
Legitimate 
Illness 
Psychosis 
Legitimate 
Illness 
Sympathy towards Defendant .075 .143* .489* .490* 
Sympathy towards Victim -.041 .031 .067 
Knowledge .462* .361* 
Depression Legitimate Illness .707* 
*significant at the p <.01 level 
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This demonstrates that greater sympathy towards the defendant was 
influenced by a greater level of knowledge the juror reported regarding 
postpartum illnesses and the more likely they considered postpartum depression 
and psychosis to be legitimate illness. 
Gender and Sympathy 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA demonstrated that there was a 
significant effect of jurors' gender on the level of sympathy for both the 
defendant (F (1, 431) = 5.57, p<.05) . and the victim (F (1, 431) = 12.43, p<.001). 
In both instances, females' ratings of sympathy were significantly higher than 
those of males for the defendant (M= 5.88, SD = 2.33) and the victim (M = 9.16, 
SD = 1.5) males (defendant: M = 5.25, SD = 2.32, victim: M = 8.52, SD = 1.86). 
Children and Sympathy 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA demonstrated that, participants 
who currently reside with children did not show significant differences in their 
reported level of sympathy for both the defendant (F (4, 424) = .95, p =.435) and 
the victim (F (4, 424) = 1.51, p = .20), compared to participants who did not 
reside with children. 
Discussion 
The aim of this study included examining mock juror attributes, 
incorporating the gender of the juror, jurors' attitudes regarding the insanity 
defence and jurors' confidence in their verdict, when rendering judgments of 
criminal responsibility in infanticide cases. It further aimed to examine a revised 
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version of the insanity defence, put forward by Yannoulidis (2003). This revised 
insanity defence attempts to incorporate what is now understood about mental 
illnesses with the traditional legal test. 
Yannoulidis (2003) provided a reformulated insanity defence which 
adopted a psychological approach in contrast to the traditional legal approach. As 
this reformulated psychological insanity defence was under investigation for the 
first time, it was not known whether it would be preferred to the traditional 
insanity defence. As a result it was hypothesised that the frequencies of 
participants rendering verdicts that accepted a reformulated insanity defence 
would be similar to those rendering verdicts that accepted a traditional insanity 
defence. However, it was argued that participants would report higher confidence 
levels when using the psychological insanity defence in conjunction with legal 
instructions in the form of a step-by-step analysis of the provided law. The 
results from the present study indicated that there was not a significant main 
effect for verdict nor was there a significant association between a juror's rated 
level of confidence and their verdict rendered. 
In relation to the Infanticide provision, it was hypothesised that mock 
jurors may indicate greater confidence in their verdict when using this provision 
on the basis that it adequately encapsulates the current position of the mother in 
terms of not being fully recovered from the effects of birth. This was supported 
in the current study with participants choosing a Guilty of Infanticide verdict 
80% of the time in comparison to a Guilty of Murder or Not Guilty verdict. 
In regard to postpartum illness, it was argued that mothers in the vignettes 
who had been diagnosed with postpartum psychosis would be perceived more as 
meeting the criteria for the Infanticide provision and Insanity Defence, compared 
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to mothers experiencing postpartum depression. Further, it was hypothesised that 
mothers with a history of mental illness following the postpartum period would 
be more likely to receive an Insanity or Infanticide verdict (as opposed to a 
Murder verdict), compared to mothers who had only experienced a single 
episode of mental illness symptoms. The results indicated that participants who 
received the Infanticide provision were more likely to render a Guilty of 
Infanticide verdict regardless of the defendant's psychological history. In 
comparison, a Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) verdict was more often 
rendered for mothers who experienced a single episode, rather than recurring 
mental illness when jurors were provided with the psychological Insanity 
Defence, but not the traditional insanity defence. In the traditional legal insanity 
condition, participants rendered more Guilty of Murder verdicts for the recurring 
mental illness condition. 
It was hypothesised that by utilising the IDA-R, it would be possible to 
determine whether mock-juror's attitudes would predict their verdict rendered. 
The results from this study determined that the IDA-R was predictive for the 
revised psychological insanity defence only, and not the traditional legal insanity 
test. This was further affected by the gender of the juror, with females who 
scored low on the IDA-R rendering more NGRI (for both defences) than high 
[DA-R scorers. This was not significant for male jurors. 
In relation to the gender of the juror, it was hypothesised two alternative 
lines of prediction could apply. This included that female mock jurors would 
react more negatively towards the mother in the vignettes compared to males, or 
conversely that female jurors would sympathise more than males with the 
defendant. The results indicated that females rated higher levels of sympathy for 
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both the defendant and victim, in comparison to males. However, there was a not 
a significant interaction between the gender of the juror and the verdict rendered. 
Further, whether the defendant lived with children or not, did not have an effect 
on their level of sympathy towards the defendant or victim. 
In relation to the participant sample who took part in this research, 45.5% 
reported living with one or more children and nearly all participants (99.53%) 
reported having at least one hour of contact with children per week. However, a 
relatively high proportion of participants (18.89%) had experienced the death of 
their own child, or the child of a close friend or relative, under the age of 7 years 
and within the past five years. The high percentage of participants experiencing 
the death of a child may be a true representation of the general public, 
demonstrating the wide effect a child's death has upon other people. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS; 2008) released a media release 
pertaining to the health of children in Australia. In this release, it was stated that 
the death rates for children aged 1-14 years of age had decreased from 30 to 15 
deaths per 100, 000 children. During a two year period (2002-2004) an average 
of 1 200 infant deaths occurred in Australia each year. In 2005, the death rate for 
neonatal deaths (deaths within the first four weeks of life) was 3.6 per 1,000 live 
births, and 1.4 per 1,000 live births for post-neonatal infant deaths (deaths after 
28 days and before one year of life). It was also reported that the death rate for 
children aged 1-14 years has decreased, but remains stable for children under 12 
months of age. However, whilst the ABS (2008) data statistics might represent a 
small proportion of recorded child deaths, the current study may suggest that 
there is a wide emotional ramification that a child death has many individuals, 
including parents, extended family and friends. 
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A limitation includes that the question enquired about whether the 
participant had experienced the death of their own child, or that of a close friend 
or relative. This can encompass a wide proportion of the population due to 
friendship networks, especially given the small population of Tasmania in 
comparison to other Australian states. Further, the question enquires only for 
children aged under the age of 7 years. In responding, participants may have 
included incidences of miscarriages experienced by themselves, relatives or 
friends. Robotham and Somerville (2009) report that one in three women aged 
less than 30 years has experienced a miscarriage. This figure could therefore 
inflate the data from the current study, resulting in the high proportion of 
participants who have reported experiencing a child death. 
Alternatively, this research was advertised with the explicit requirements 
that participation would involve, namely, that the individual would be required to 
complete questionnaires and deliberate, as an individual, on the guilt of a 
defendant who is charged with the murder of her own child and wishes to argue a 
defence to the charge. As a result of this, participants who had experienced either 
the death of their own, or someone-else's, child may have been selectively drawn 
to the experiment due to the emotional salience of the advertised research 
(Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996). If this was indeed the case for the 
current study, it can be argued that the results cannot be generalised to the wider 
community. Further research would be required to separate those who had 
experienced their own child's death and those who had answered the question 
referring to a friend or relatives child. In terms of jury selection and cases of 
infanticide, it would be highly likely that a parent who has experienced the death 
of a child would be excluded from jury duty. 
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In relation to social desirability, females scored higher (M= 15.91) than 
males (M= 14.20) on the M-C SDS instrument. Whilst this difference was slight, 
it was deemed to be statistically significant. Despite this, it is not uncommon for 
these gender differences to exist when measuring socially desirable behaviours. 
Katkin (1996) evaluated whether gender differences existed on two measures of 
social desirability, including the M-C SDS. That research determined that 
females' scores correlated more highly than males' on both of the administered 
social desirability instruments. Katkin suggested that it may be assumed that 
females' socially desirable responses are more strongly reinforced than for 
males, which is indicated by higher scores. Therefore, it can be argued that this 
difference in social desirability most likely is not unrepresentative sampling in 
regard to this variable and that the results obtained are reliable, which would not 
have been so if the males had scored higher on this instrument. 
The factor analysis conducted in the present study on the IDA-R yielded 
similar, but slightly lower, loadings than those obtained by the creators, Skeem et 
al. (2004). Skeem et al. tested the IDA-R on a sample of 426 Americans drawn 
from a wider population. In contrast, this study obtained 437 participants drawn 
predominantly from a university population. This limited sample may have 
contributed to the lower loadings. However, the instrument was developed in an 
American sample, and American law and sentences differ from Australian law, 
including a death penalty in some states of America. A recent study, also 
conducted in America, by Vitacco et al. (2009), demonstrated that higher scores 
on the IDA-R (reflecting a negative attitude towards the insanity defence) were 
also related to higher perception of insanity defence use and greater support for 
the death penalty. As a result of this finding, it is suggested that the IDA-R 
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requires further validation within an Australian sample before more definitive 
conclusions can be made. 
In relation to psychological history, the current study hypothesized that 
mock-jurors would be more likely to render a verdict of Guilty of Infanticide or 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (either traditional or reformulation-
psychological defence) when the mother had a previous established history of 
postpartum depression or psychosis, compared to mother who did not have a 
documented history (considered a transient, or single episode, illness). This 
hypothesis was not supported in the present study. Rather, jurors were 
significantly more likely to render a verdict of Guilty of Infanticide more often 
than Guilty of Murder or Not Guilty, regardless of the defendant's psychological 
history. This was also true for the reformulated psychology insanity defence. 
Previous research suggests that juror's verdicts are influenced by 
attributions they make based on the defendant's mental health. When the 
perpetrator is diagnosed with a mental illness, jurors make more negative 
attributions and assign greater blameworthiness, responsibility and controllability 
(Corrigan, Markowitz, Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003). In contrast, Henkel's 
(2008) research also supports this finding, with jurors more likely to find a 
defendant guilty if he/she is experiencing a mental illness, compared to a medical 
disorder. This may be due to jurors feeling pressured to convict a person 
suffering from a mental illness due to the misconception that these individuals 
are 'ticking time bombs' (Appelbaum, 2004, p. 1105), so that their incarceration 
is seen as necessary for public safety. 
In the case of infanticide, it may be perceived that there are two victims 
in this emotive crime — the child as well as the mother. As a result of this, 
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participants may have felt that rendering a Guilty of Infanticide or NGRI was 
acceptable, regardless of the defendant's psychological history, due to the variety 
of sentencing options that were available when rendering a verdict, including 
receiving treatment or being hospitalized. Alternatively, all legal tests for 
infanticide and insanity asked the juror to make a judgment based on the current 
incident. As, at the time of the child's death, all scenarios depicted the mother 
laboring under a postpartum illness, the juror may not have factored the 
defendant's psychological history into their decision-making process as stated by 
the legal tests. 
When incorporating mock-jurors' 1DA-R scores, there was a significant 
effect for a defendant acting under a transient postpartum illness (both depression 
and psychosis) upon the jurors' verdict. This demonstrated that high IDA-R 
scorers were more inclined to render a guilty verdict (either Murder or 
Infanticide) than a not guilty verdict (including NGRI) compared to low IDA-R 
scorers. This supports Skeem et al.'s (2004) assertion that the IDA-R has 
predictive utility, and this is also true for across legal jurisdictions. Skeem et al.'s 
original study was focused upon an American sample, whereas the current study 
incorporated an Australian sample. However, it was not generalised across case 
manipulations, as this effect was not significant for recurring psychological 
history condition. 
It can be argued that this finding was due to the sensitive nature of the 
scenarios presented in the current study. Skeem et al. (2004) employed vignettes 
that were previously used in a study conducted by Roberts, Golding, and 
Fincham (1987). The vignettes depicted mentally ill individuals who were 
diagnosed with either schizophrenia or a personality disorder. These vignettes 
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included a man murdering a mailman either by stabbing and removing the 
mailman's heart (bizarre condition) or stabbing (non-bizarre condition), whilst 
also considering the effect of planfulness (either the act was planned or it was 
spontaneous). The differs greatly from the current study, where there was no 
planned act, the act of smothering may be regarded as less violent than stabbing 
(Dunn et al., 2006) and further, the mental illnesses used in the current study 
were specifically for the postpartum period and involved the death of a child. 
These factors may have provoked more sympathy in the juror's for both the 
defendant and victims (as indicated by the results of the post-experimental 
questionnaire) thus affecting the predictive utility of the IDA-R in infanticide 
cases. 
Interestingly, when accounting for the legal test provided to mock jurors 
and their IDA-R scores, there was a significant effect for the reformulated 
insanity defence but not for the traditional insanity defence or the infanticide 
provision. This effect, again, supports Skeem et al.'s (2004) assertion that the 
IDA-R has predictive utility. However, the same was not true for the traditional 
legal insanity defence. It may be speculated that the reformulated insanity 
defence taps into the laypersons' understanding of insanity as suggested by the 
literature (Turvey, 2008). The reformulated insanity defence was proposed by 
Yannoulidis (2003) as the current legal insanity defence does not encompass the 
psychiatric conception of mental disorder and may be considered to be an excuse 
for an individual's actions, rather than pertaining to their mental status and 
psychological history which impacted upon their actions at the time of the crime. 
In research that examines mock jurors' verdicts in insanity cases, without 
providing them with legal tests or instructions, these jurors rendered verdicts that 
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would be considered to be more accurate than those rendered when the insanity 
defence is employed. Finkel and Handel (1989) determined that in these 
instances, mock jurors made discriminations among cases, and that their concepts 
of insanity were relevant, flexible and were more complex than that encapsulated 
by the legal insanity defence. The finding that the reformulated insanity defence 
had a significant association with participant's IDA-R scores may reflect this 
literature. That is; due to the complex information that is incorporated in the legal 
insanity defence and the instructions provided to jurors in order to guide them in 
their decision-making, participants may be more inclined to render verdicts that 
are inconsistent with the law. In contrast, the reformulated insanity defence is 
closely associated to the internal schemas of what they understand as insanity 
and mental illness that the IDA-R was able to 'tap into' these internal beliefs, and 
thus provide a true reflection of their attitude and higher predictive utility. 
It was hypothesized that mothers diagnosed with, or experiencing 
symptoms of, postpartum psychosis would be perceived more as meeting the 
criteria for the infanticide provision and insanity defence, compared to mothers 
experiencing postpartum depression. This was supported by the findings in the 
current study. Mock jurors were more likely to render a Guilty of Murder verdict 
if the defendant was suffering from postpartum depression. For postpartum 
psychosis, there was a higher usage of the Guilty of Infanticide or NGRI 
(traditional and reformulated), compared to those rendered n the postpartum 
depression scenarios. These three options allow the defendant to receive 
treatment and /or hospitalization rather than a jail-term sentence. This suggests 
that mock jurors perceived postpartum psychosis as being more likely to meet the 
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criteria set out by these legal tests, whereas a defendant experiencing postpartum 
depression was not excused from the murder verdict more readily. 
This finding regarding postpartum illnesses strengthens the argument put 
forward by d'Orban (1977) that suggests that postpartum depression, in isolation 
to other mental illnesses, is not sufficient to support the criteria set out by the 
infanticide provision or insanity defence. Further, postpartum depression is not 
viewed as acute enough to affect the defendant's reasoning to know the nature 
and quality of the act committed was wrong, or that due to postpartum depression 
she did not know what she was doing was wrong, as stipulated by the insanity 
legal test. The impediment with this finding is that the infanticide provision tends 
to be more associated with cases involving postpartum depression (Laporte et al., 
2003). This may be due to women arguing the insanity defence in the instance of 
postpartum psychosis. Therefore, due to the high incidence rate of postpartum 
depression and the significant impact on the mother and her child, not only 
including murdering her child, but also neglect and child abuse that can arise due 
to this postpartum illness, greater research attention should be paid to this area. 
That is to say, that due to the high incidence rate of depression in new mothers, 
the detrimental effect on the mother and the relationship with her child, and the 
demonstration that a woman suffering from postpartum depression is more likely 
to be found guilty of the crime, more needs to be done in the court of law to 
allow for and to consider the findings from the current research. 
In regard to legal instructions and juror confidence, it was hypothesized 
that participants would report higher confidence when choosing to render the 
reformulated insanity defence and when they are provided with step-by-step 
instructions. The results from this study showed that in fact there was no 
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significant effect for confidence in relation to verdict. However, it was 
demonstrated that when mock-jurors did not receive step-by-step instructions, 
they were more inclined to render a Guilty of Murder verdict compared to 
participants who did receive such instructions. This may suggest that the step-by-
step instructions allowed participants the opportunity to more fully comprehend 
and work through the legal tests and thus render alternative verdicts than those 
who were provided with the legal test only. It can be argued that this contradicts 
Wheatman and Shaffer's (2001) results, where they determined that individuals 
do not attend to and are less inclined to abide by legal instructions. In the current 
study, it appeared that mock jurors did follow the legal instructions, when they 
are provided in an understandable, simplified form and in a way that broke down 
the legal test into a series of steps. 
For the insanity defences, as the reformulated insanity defence was under 
investigation for the first time, it was unknown if it would be rendered as a 
verdict more frequently in comparison to the traditional insanity defence. This 
study demonstrated that when participants received the traditional insanity 
defence, participants were more likely to render a Guilty of Murder than a NGRI 
verdict (51% compared to 47%). In contrast, when participants were presented 
with the reformulated insanity defence, a NGRI was the more likely verdict than 
one of murder (54% compared to 46%). It has been continually argued that an 
update of the insanity defence is imperative to incorporate what is now 
understood about mental illnesses (Morris, 1953; Becker, 2003). This study 
offers preliminary evidence that a reformulated insanity defence that is either the 
same, or similar, to that proposed by Yannoulidis (2003) offers the promise of 
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being an acceptable, easier to understand and a preferred insanity defence 
compared to the M'Naghten rule. 
Previous literature (for example, Kaplan & Miller, 1978) indicates that 
the gender of the juror is an unknown contributor to the judicial process. Further, 
the relationship between the jurors' gender and the proneness to convict is not 
simple, but can be moderated by many other factors. The current study 
hypothesized that the gender of the juror would influence the verdicts rendered, 
but two lines of argument could apply. This includes that female mock jurors 
could react more negatively towards the defendant compared to male mock 
jurors (resulting in a higher frequency of Guilty of Murder verdicts), or female 
mock jurors may sympathise more than males and render more NGRI (traditional 
and reformulated) or Guilty of Infanticide verdicts. 
There was a significant difference in levels of rated sympathy for the 
defendant and victim between males and females, with females rating 
significantly higher levels of sympathy in both instances. The results from the 
current study also indicated a significant association between IDA-R scores for 
females, but not for males. This demonstrated that the IDA-R had high predictive 
utility, with high scoring females rendering a higher frequency of Guilty of 
Murder verdicts and low IDA-R scorers rendering a higher frequency of NGRI 
(both the traditional and reformulated defence) verdicts. A similar significant 
association between illness and verdict was also determined with female jurors 
rendering a higher frequency of Guilty of Murder verdicts when the defendant 
was experiencing postpartum depression. This was not apparent for the 
postpartum psychosis condition, or for male jurors. There is no concrete evidence 
from these findings to reinforce the claim that the infanticide provision should be 
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abolished, leaving women who have committed a crime, and suffering from a 
postpartum illness to argue their diminished criminal responsibility using the 
insanity defence (Osborne, 1987). 
Whilst females rated higher levels of sympathy towards the defendant and 
the victim, this did not affect the frequency of Guilty of Murder or NGRI 
verdicts. It may be suggested that, due to the high level of emotion that the death 
of a child provokes, this has overridden any sympathy towards the defendant 
affecting the verdict rendered. Participants may have actually perceived that 
there were two victims in the scenario, the mother and the child (Laporte et al., 
2003) and thus hindered their emotion and sympathy from interplaying in their 
decision as they attempted to deliver a fair and just verdict. 
Lastly, the post-experimental questionnaire indicated that whilst the 
population held some knowledge regarding postpartum illnesses, on the whole 
information is lacking. This is concerning due to the high incidence rates of 
postpartum illnesses, specifically postpartum depression. This lack of 
information may also demonstrate why participants felt that postpartum illness, 
particularly postpartum depression, are not legitimate illnesses. It can be 
suggested that health organizations need to address this area and provide 
information campaigns to the wider community. This in turn, may lower the 
amount of postpartum illnesses developing into more serious cases, as new 
mothers (and their families) become more aware of the signs and symptoms and 
seeking treatment at an earlier, rather than later, stage of the illness (Buist et al., 
2005; Buist et al., 2006). Currently, the Australian Health Ministers' Advisory 
Council and the Australian Government have collaborated to develop the 
National Perinatal Depression Initiative (Australian Government Department of 
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Health and Aging, 2010). This initiative aims to improve prevention and early 
detection of antenatal (during pregnancy) and postnatal depression, as well as 
providing better support and treatment for expectant and new mothers who are 
experiencing depression. This initiative offers promising results in terms of 
detecting depression, providing treatment, as well as ensuring follow-up support 
and engagement with other health services are maintained for optimal benefits. 
There are some limitations to the current study that could be addressed if 
this research were to be replicated to help maximize the quality of the 
information obtained. An area of further enhancement is to include a screening 
item on the demographic questionnaire to ascertain whether participants were 
experiencing, or had previously experienced, a mental illness. This could 
incorporate adding a measure of current depression symptoms, for example the 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), or 
explicitly asking whether the participant (and/or any of the participant's family) 
have experienced a postpartum illness. 
The participant sample for the current study was primarily recruited from 
a university, specifically students studying psychology. In regard to the insanity 
defence it is argued that, in general, university students hold mixed opinions 
about the defence, compared to the general public. Large-scale attitude surveys 
demonstrate that the wider community holds an overwhelming negative opinion 
of the mentally ill and even more negative opinions of the criminally insane 
(Steadman & Cocozza, 1978). Furthermore, these attitudes are entrenched in the 
belief that the insanity defence is a loophole in the criminal law where its use is 
often highly exaggerated and the public are often misinformed about the 
common dispositional effects of an insanity acquittal (Roberts et al., 1987). Due 
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to the population from which this participant sample was derived, the results may 
have been affected and biased towards the attitudes and opinions of psychology 
university students. It is also assumed that the mean age of a jury panel would be 
slightly older than that obtained in the current sample. As such, it is 
recommended that future research into infanticide draws from the general 
population to gain more insight into the attitudes and juror characteristics that 
interplay in the juror decision making process in infanticide and insanity cases. 
Further, the current questionnaire only obtained data as to whether the participant 
was living with any children in the household. If this study were to be replicated, 
this question could be broken down to enquire specifically whether the children 
are the participants' step-children or siblings (given the young age of the 
participant sample). 
The current study has provided some important initial insights into 
understanding what juror factors can impact upon their decision making process 
when rendering verdicts regarding the guilt of the defendant in infanticide cases. 
While this line of research has tended to be overlooked in the past, receiving 
little investigative attention, this study has highlighted the importance of 
awareness of postpartum illnesses and the impact a mental illness has in the court 
of law. In regard to the reformulated insanity defence, this study demonstrated 
that it was an effective attempt at updating the traditional insanity defence, as this 
verdict was rendered more frequently. This suggests that the reformulated 
definition may encapsulate what jurors now understand of insanity and is more 
comprehensible. In the current study, women suffering from postpartum 
depression were more likely to be found Guilty of Murder, than women suffering 
from postpartum psychosis. This suggests that participants distinguished that 
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postpartum depression does not meet the legal criteria for insanity and the 
infanticide provision as proposed by Stanton et al. (2002). It was determined that 
the IDA-R had predictive utility in regard to verdicts rendered, however it 
requires further research and refinement before it can be regarded as a 
psychometrically sound measure in an Australian population. 
In conclusion, the current study investigated the effect of various mock-
juror attributes when rendering verdicts on infanticide and insanity cases, 
including trialling a revised insanity defence that incorporates a psychological 
definition of mental illness. The current study demonstrated that the revised 
insanity defence devised by Yannoulidis (2003) shows promise of leading the 
way in successfully constructing a preferred and updated insanity defence. The 
current study also indicated that there is a pervasive negative attitude within the 
community towards postnatal depression. That is; many individuals regard 
postnatal depression as not constituting a 'legitimate' mental illness. This finding 
suggests that community-based interventions need to be conducted to increase 
the population's understanding and knowledge regarding postnatal illnesses. 
This, in turn, will also increase awareness and detection of postnatal illnesses 
resulting in more women who are affected seeking treatment. The current 
National Perinatal Depression Initiative (Australian Government Department of 
Health and Aging, 2010) is designed to meet this need. Lastly, the study 
indicated that female participants' sympathy towards the defendant and victim 
did not appear to alter their verdict compared to males. This demonstrates that 
loading the jury with females for infanticide cases will not result in biased 
verdicts. However further research; including investigating the effect of gender 
in group deliberations will need to be conducted before a definitive conclusion 
can be reached. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire and Vignettes 
Demographic Questionnaire: 
Please answer the following questions: 
What is your current age (in years)? 	 
Sex (please circle): MALE 	 FEMALE 
How many children live in your household? 0 	1 	2 	3 	4+ 
On average, how many hours do you have in contact with children per week? 
0 	1-2 	3-4 	5-6 	7-8 	9+ 
Have you ever served on a jury before? 	YES NO 
In the last ten years have you, or a close friend or relative, experienced the death 
of a child under the age of 7 years? 
YES 	 NO 
Insanity Defence Attitudes Scale - Revised 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements by circling the appropriate number. A rating of 1 = you strongly 
disagree, 3-neutral and 5= strongly agree. 
Strongly disagree 
Strongly agree 
I I believe that people should be held 
responsible for their actions no matter 
what their mental condition 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 For the right price, psychiatrists will 
probably manufacture a "mental 
illness" for any criminal to convince the 
jury that he is insane 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 I believe that we should punish a person 
for a criminal act only if he understood 
the act as evil and then freely chose to 
do it 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 I believe that all human beings know 
what they are doing and have the power 
to control themselves 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 It is wrong to punish someone for an act 
they commit because of any 
uncontrollable illness, whether it be 
epilepsy or mental illness 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 The insanity defence threatens public 
safety by telling criminals that they can 
get away with a crime if they come up 
with a good story about why they did it 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 I believe that mental illness can impair 
people's ability to make logical choices 
and control themselves 
1 2 3 4 5 
The insanity defence returns disturbed, 
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dangerous people to the streets 1 2 3 4 5 
9 Mentally ill defendants who plead 
insanity have failed to exert enough 
willpower to behave properly like the 
rest of us. So, they should be punished 
for their crime like everyone else 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 As a last resort, defence lawyers will 
encourage their clients to act strangely 
and lie through their teeth to appear 
"insane" 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 A defendant's degree of insanity is 
irrelevant: if he commits the crime, then 
he should do the time 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 Perfectly sane killers can get away with 
their crimes by hiring high-priced 
lawyers and experts who misuse the 
insanity defence 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 The insanity plea is a loophole in the 
law that allows too many guilty people 
to escape punishment 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 We should punish people who commit 
criminal acts, regardless of their degree 
of mental disturbance 
1 2 3 4 5 
15 It is wrong to punish people who 
commit crime for crazy reasons while 
gripped by uncontrollable 
hallucinations or delusions 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 Most defendants who use the insanity 
defence are truly mentally ill, not fakers 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Some people with severe mental illness 
are out of touch with reality and do not 
understand that their acts are wrong. 
These people cannot be blamed and do 
not deserve to be punished 
1 2 3 4 5 
18 Many of the crazy criminals that 
psychiatrists see fit to return to the 
streets go on to kill again 
1 2 3 4 5 
19 With slick lawyers and a sad story, any 
criminal can use the insanity defence to 
cheat his way to freedom 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
Please read the following statements, and circle whether the statements are 
true (they apply to you) or false (they don't apply to you), for most of the time. 
I. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications 
of all the candidates 
TRUE FALSE 
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in 
trouble 
TRUE FALSE 
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I 
am not encouraged 
TRUE FALSE 
4. I have never intensely disliked someone TRUE FALSE 
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to 
succeed in life 
TRUE FALSE 
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way TRUE FALSE 
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress TRUE FALSE 
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out 
at a restaurant 
TRUE FALSE 
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I 
was not seen, I would probably do it 
TRUE FALSE 
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something 
because I thought too little of my ability 
TRUE FALSE 
I 	1 . [like to gossip at times TRUE FALSE 
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against 
people in authority even though I knew they were right 
TRUE FALSE 
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener TRUE FALSE 
14. I can remember 'playing sick' to get out of something TRUE FALSE 
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of 
someone 
TRUE FALSE 
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake TRUE FALSE 
17. I always try to practice what I preach TRUE FALSE 
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud 
mouthed, obnoxious people 
TRUE FALSE 
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget TRUE FALSE 
20. When I don't know something I don't mind at all 
admitting it 
TRUE FALSE 
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are 
disagreeable 
TRUE FALSE 
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own 
way 
TRUE FALSE 
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing 
things 
TRUE FALSE 
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished 
for my wrong-doings 
TRUE FALSE 
25. I never resent being asked to return a favour TRUE FALSE 
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas 
very different from my own 
TRUE FALSE 
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of 
my car 
TRUE FALSE 
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the 
good fortune of others 
TRUE FALSE 
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off TRUE FALSE 
96 
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of 
me 
TRUE FALSE 
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause TRUE FALSE 
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they 
only got what they deserved 
TRUE FALSE 
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt 
someone's feelings 
TRUE FALSE 
Case Vignettes 
Postpartum depression, smothering, re-occurring 
Katie is a 30 year old woman who is a high school teacher, although has 
taken the last two years off work. She is married and has a child, Sam, who is 18 
months old and recently gave birth to her second child, Lauren, 8 weeks 
previously. Katie has a history of depression, beginning in adolescence. She was 
also diagnosed with post-partum depression, following the birth of Sam. 
However, the symptoms were noticed early and treated immediately. 
Following the birth of her second child, Katie became sad with frequent 
periods of tearfulness. She also lost weight, felt lethargic, guilty over trivial 
problems, experienced little pleasure in life and showed little interest in looking 
after the children. Her partner, John, had noticed small changes in Katie's mood, 
but had been working overtime, and so was too busy to address any problems. 
In the eighth week following the birth of Lauren, Katie had received a 
phone call from John late in the afternoon, stating that he probably would not be 
home as he had been asked to work back and had to attend a conference early in 
the morning. She put the children to bed early and went to bed for an early night 
herself. However, at 2am in the morning Lauren began screaming. Katie was 
worried that she would awaken her Sam and quickly ran to attend to her. She 
tried to settle Lauren down, but she continued to cry for an hour. Katie then 
placed her back in the crib and placed the pillow over Lauren's face and 
proceeded to smother her. Afterwards, she rang John and told him he could come 
home and hung up. John was worried about the phone call and returned home 
immediately. Katie was sitting silently in the lounge room, refusing to say 
anything. He called the police upon discovery of Lauren's body. 
Katie has been charged (under Infanticide provision OR charged with 
Murder and wishes to argue the Insanity defence). You, as a jury member, have 
been asked to provide a verdict. 
Postpartum depression, smothering, transient 
Katie is a 30 year old woman who is a high school teacher, although has 
taken the last two years off work. She is married and has a child, Sam, who is 18 
months old and recently gave birth to her second child, Lauren, 8 weeks 
previously. It is stated that Katie has never been diagnosed, or experienced any 
symptoms of depression previously. 
Following the birth of her second child, Katie became sad with frequent 
periods of tearfulness. She also lost weight, felt lethargic, guilty over trivial 
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problems, experienced little pleasure in life and showed little interest in looking 
after the children. Her partner, John, had noticed small changes in Katie's mood, 
but had been working overtime, and so was too busy to address any problems. 
In the eighth week following the birth of Lauren, Katie had received a 
phone call from John late in the afternoon, stating that he probably would not be 
home as he had been asked to work back and had to attend a conference early in 
the morning. She put the children to bed early and went to bed for an early night 
herself. However, at 2am in the morning Lauren began screaming. Katie was 
worried that she would awaken her Sam and quickly ran to attend to her. She 
tried to settle Lauren down, but she continued to cry for an hour. Katie then 
placed her back in the crib and placed the pillow over Lauren's face and 
proceeded to smother her. Afterwards, she rang John and told him he could come 
home and hung up. John was worried about the phone call and returned home 
immediately. Katie was sitting silently in the lounge room, refusing to say 
anything. He called the police upon discovery of Lauren's body. 
Katie has been charged (under Infanticide provision OR charged with 
Murder and wishes to argue the Insanity defence). You, as a jury member, have 
been asked to provide a verdict. 
Postpartum psychosis, smothering, re -occurring 
Katie is a 30 year old woman who is a high school teacher, although has 
taken the last two years off work. She is married and has a child, Sam, who is 18 
months old and recently gave birth to her second child, Lauren, 8 weeks 
previously. Katie has a history of psychosis, and experienced some symptoms 
following the birth of Sam. However, these were noticed early and treated 
immediately. 
Following the birth of her second child, Katie stated repeatedly that she 
'just didn't feel right' and that her family would be 'better off without her' to 
family and friends. It was also noticed that she repeatedly checked on the 
children and was constantly worried about their health and safety for no apparent 
reason and always appeared agitated. Katie complained of hearing voices and 
noises that constantly interrupted her thoughts. This was disregarded as Katie 
lives in a busy district near a train station. Burns and sores were also noticed on 
her arms, but as she cooked often, these were disregarded. Her partner, John, had 
noticed small changes in Katie's mood and behaviour, but had been working 
overtime, and so was too busy to address any problems. 
In the eighth week following the birth of Lauren, Katie had received a 
phone call from John late in the afternoon, stating that he probably would not be 
home as he had been asked to work back and had to attend a conference early in 
the morning. She put the children to bed early and went to bed for an early night 
herself. However, at 2am in the morning Lauren began screaming. Katie was 
worried that she would awaken her Sam and quickly ran to attend to her. She 
tried to settle Lauren down, but she continued to cry for an hour. Katie then 
placed her back in the crib and placed the pillow over Lauren's face and 
proceeded to smother her. Afterwards, she rang John and told him he could come 
home and hung up. John was worried about the phone call and returned home 
immediately. Katie was sitting silently in the lounge room, refusing to say 
anything. He called the police upon discovery of Lauren's body. 
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Katie states that following the birth of her child, Satan repeatedly came to 
her, telling her that he was going to take her baby and that her child would grow 
up and destroy the world. In crisis, she turned to God, who ordered her to send 
Lauren to him, so that he could protect her. Although she was reluctant to do so, 
she soon believed that this was the only way to save her child and the world. 
Katie has been charged (under Infanticide provision OR charged with 
Murder and wishes to argue the Insanity defence). You, as a jury member, have 
been asked to provide a verdict. 
Postpartum psychosis, smothering, transient 
Katie is a 30 year old woman who is a high school teacher, although has 
taken the last two years off work. She is married and has a child, Sam, who is 18 
months old and recently gave birth to her second child, Lauren, 8 weeks 
previously. It is stated that Katie has never been diagnosed, or experienced any 
symptoms of psychosis previously. 
Following the birth of her second child, Katie stated repeatedly that she 
'just didn't feel right' and that her family would be 'better off without her' to 
family and friends. It was also noticed that she repeatedly checked on the 
children and was constantly worried about their health and safety for no apparent 
reason and always appeared agitated. Katie complained of hearing voices and 
noises that constantly interrupted her thoughts. This was disregarded as Katie 
lives in a busy district near a train station. Burns and sores were also noticed on 
her arms, but as she cooked often, these were disregarded. Her partner, John, had 
noticed small changes in Katie's mood and behaviour, but had been working 
overtime, and so was too busy to address any problems. 
In the eighth week following the birth of Lauren, Katie had received a 
phone call from John late in the afternoon, stating that he probably would not be 
home as he had been asked to work back and had to attend a conference early in 
the morning. She put the children to bed early and went to bed for an early night 
herself. However, at 2am in the morning Lauren began screaming. Katie was 
worried that she would awaken her Sam and quickly ran to attend to her. She 
tried to settle Lauren down, but she continued to cry for an hour. Katie then 
placed her back in the crib and placed the pillow over Lauren's face and 
proceeded to smother her. Afterwards, she rang John and told him he could come 
home and hung up. John was worried about the phone call and returned home 
immediately. Katie was sitting silently in the lounge room, refusing to say 
anything. He called the police upon discovery of Lauren's body. 
Katie states that following the birth of her child, Satan repeatedly came to 
her, telling her that he was going to take her baby and that her child would grow 
up and destroy the world. In crisis, she turned to God, who ordered her to send 
Lauren to him, so that he could protect her. Although she was reluctant to do so, 
she soon believed that this was the only way to save her child and the world. 
Katie has been charged (under Infanticide provision OR charged with 
Murder and wishes to argue the Insanity defence). You, as a jury member, have 
been asked to provide a verdict. 
1 	2 	3 	4 
Not at all 
Confident 
5 	6 
	
7 	8 	910 
Neutral 	 Extremely 
Confident 
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Legal test and Juror Instructions 
Infanticide provision — no instructions 
In order to decide whether the defendant (Katie) is guilty of Infanticide under 
section of s165A of the Tasmanian Criminal Code (1924), it must be 
demonstrated that 
A woman who by any willful act or omission, causes death of her child 
(being a child under the age of 12 months), and who was at the time not fully 
recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child, and the balance of her 
mind being, by reason thereof, disturbed, is guilty of a crime, which is called 
infanticide, although the offence would, but for this section, have amounted 
to murder. 
Using the above legal principle please reach a verdict as to whether the Katie is 
guilty or not guilty under the section. 
I find the defendant to be (please circle one): 
GUILTY (of Infanticide) 
GUILTY (of Murder) 
NOT-GUILTY 
Please rate your confidence in your verdict: 
Infanticide provision — instructions 
In order to decide whether the defendant (Katie) is guilty of Infanticide under 
section of s165A of the Tasmanian Criminal Code (1924), it must be 
demonstrated that 
A woman who by any willful act or omission, causes death of her child 
(being a child under the age of 12 months), and who was at the time not fully 
recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child, and the balance of her 
mind being, by reason thereof, disturbed, is guilty of a crime, which is called 
1 	2 	3 	4 
Definitely 
NO 
5 	6 	7 	8 
	
9 10 
Don't 	 Definitely 
Know 	 YES 
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infanticide, although the offence would, but for this section, have amounted 
to murder. 
Using the above legal principle please reach a verdict as to whether the Katie is 
guilty or not guilty under the section. 
In order to do this, please consider the following: 
1. Did Katie cause the death of her 8 week old infant, Lauren, by either 
acting or failing to act? 
3 	4 	5 	6 
	
7 	8 
	
9 10 
Definitely 
NO 
Don't 
Know 
Definitely 
YES 
2. Was Katie fully recovered from the effects of giving birth? 
      
      
1 
	
2 	3 
	
4 	5 
	
6 	7 
	
8 	910 
Definitely Don't 	 Definitely 
NO 
	
Know 	 YES 
3. Was Katie's reasoning disturbed due to childbirth? 
  
      
      
I find the defendant to be (please circle one): 
GUILTY (of Infanticide) 
GUILTY (of Murder) 
NOT-GUILTY 
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Please rate your confidence in your verdict: 
3 4 5 6 7 8 910 
Not at all 	 Neutral 	 Extremely 
Confident 	 Confident 
Insanity — no instruction 
In order to decide whether the defendant (Katie) is not guilty by reason of 
insanity (NGRI) in regard to the charge of homicide under section of s157 of the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code (1924), it must be demonstrated that 
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act done or an omission made 
by him 
(a) when afflicted with mental disease to such an extent as to render him 
incapable of — 
(i) understanding the physical character of such act or omission; 
Or 
(ii) knowing that such act or omission was one which he ought not 
to do or make; 
Using the above legal principle please reach a verdict as to whether the Katie is 
guilty or not guilty under the section. 
I find the defendant to be (please circle one): 
GUILTY 
NOT GUILTY 
NOT-GUILTY (by reason of insanity) 
Please rate your confidence in your verdict: 
1 	2 
	
3 
	
4 	5 
	
6 
	
7 	8 
	
9 10 
Not at all 
	
Neutral 
	
Extremely 
Confident 
	 Confident 
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Insanity — instructions 
In order to decide whether the defendant (Katie) is not guilty by reason of 
insanity (NGRI) in regard to the charge of homicide under section of s157 of the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code (1924), it must be demonstrated that 
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act done or an omission made 
by him 
(a) when afflicted with mental disease to such an extent as to render him 
incapable of — 
(i) understanding the physical character of such act or omission; 
Or 
(ii) knowing that such act or omission was one which he ought not 
to do or make; 
Using the above legal principle please reach a verdict as to whether the Katie is 
guilty or not guilty under the section. 
In order to do this, please consider the following: 
1. When Katie committed the act (or failed to act) was she suffering from a 
mental illness? 
3 
	
4 	5 	6 
	
8 	910 
Definitely 	 Don't Definitely 
NO Know 	 YES 
2. Did Katie understand the physical character of the act, or her failure to 
act? That is; did she know that her actions would lead to the infants 
death? 
1 	2 
	
3 	4 	5 	6 
	
7 
	
8 	910 
Definitely 	 Don't Definitely 
NO 	 Know 	 YES 
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3. 	Did she know that her actions (or failure to act) was wrong> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 
Definitely 	 Don't Definitely 
NO 	 Know YES 
I find the defendant to be (please circle one): 
GUILTY 
NOT GUILTY 
NOT-GUILTY (by reason of insanity) 
Please rate your confidence in your verdict: 
2 3 	4 	5 6 	7 	8 9 10 
Not at all 	 Neutral 	 Extremely 
Confident 	 Confident 
Reformulated insanity — no instructions 
In order to decide whether the defendant (Katie) is not guilty by reason of 
insanity (NGRI) in regard to the charge of homicide under section of s157 of the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code (1924), it must be demonstrated that 
A person is not criminally responsible if at the time of the commission of the 
offence he or she had a mental impairment which included in its symptoms 
or consequences a loss of cognitive competency to think of the reasons which 
people are expected to regard as sufficient grounds for refraining from 
commission of the offence. 
Using the above legal principle please reach a verdict as to whether the Katie is 
guilty or not guilty under the section. 
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I find the defendant to be (please circle one): 
GUILTY 
NOT GUILTY 
NOT-GUILTY (by reason of insanity) 
Please rate your confidence in your verdict: 
I 
3 	4 
	
5 	6 	7 	8 	910 
Not at all 
	
Neutral Extremely 
Confident 
	 Confident 
Reformulated insanity — instructions 
In order to decide whether the defendant (Katie) is not guilty by reason of 
insanity (NGRI) in regard to the charge of homicide under section of s157 of the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code (1924), it must be demonstrated that 
A person is not criminally responsible if at the time of the commission of the 
offence he or she had a mental impairment which included in its symptoms 
or consequences a loss of cognitive competency to think of the reasons which 
people are expected to regard as sufficient grounds for refraining from 
commission of the offence. 
Using the above legal principle please reach a verdict as to whether the Katie is 
guilty or not guilty under the section. In order to do this, please consider the 
following: 
1. Was Katie suffering from a mental impairment at the time of the 
homicide? 
1 	1 	 1 	 1 
1 2 3 	4 5 	6 
Definitely 	 Don't 
NO 	 Know 
   
7 	8 	910 
Definitely 
YES 
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2. Did a mental impairment (including its symptoms, or consequences of its 
symptoms) affect her ability to make decisions? 
1 	2 	3 	4 
Definitely 
NO 
5 
Don't 
Know 
6 	7 	8 	910 
Definitely 
YES 
I find the defendant to be (please circle one): 
GUILTY 
NOT GUILTY 
NOT-GUILTY (by reason of insanity) 
Please rate your confidence in your verdict: 
2 
	
3 	4 
	
5 
	
6 
	
7 
	
8 	910 
Not at all 
	
Neutral 
	
Extremely 
Confident 	 Confident 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions: 
How much sympathy did you feel towards the defendant (Katie)? 
1 	1 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 	9 	10 
	
None 	 Neutral 	 Extremely 
Sympathetic 
How much sympathy did you feel towards the victim (Lauren)?  
1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 	9 	10 
None 	 Neutral 	 Extremely 
Sympathetic 
How much do you know about post-partum illnesses?  
1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 	910 
Very little 	 Some 	 A lot 
or none Information 
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Is post-partum depression a legitimate illness?  
	
I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 	910 
Definitely Neutral Definitely 
No 	 Yes 
Is post-partum psychosis a legitimate illness?  
I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 	I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 	910 
Definitely Neutral Definitely 
No 	 Yes 
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Appendix B: Participation Advertisement and Information Sheet 
WOULD 
■Bor—WOU LIKE 10  
BE A JUROR? 
I am looking for participants who would be willing to 
give up 1/2  an hour of their time for a Psychology 
Masters study. 
Participation involves filling out questionnaires and 
deliberating, as an individual, on the guilt of a 
defendant who is charged with the murder of her child 
and wishes to argue a defence to the charge. 
Participants will receive % hour research credit for their 
participation 
Might be interested? Please contact me for more 
information: Heidi (hclgordon@utas.edu.au ) 
OR 
Pick up and return a questionnaire package located 
outside Sue's office (Rm 110) in the 
School of Psychology. 
Ethics approval number: H10193 
CL 	0_ 	CI. 	Q. 	a. 	0- 	a 	0_ 	Q. 	0_ 	O.. 
3.0 LO 1.13 30 30 LO 30 117 30 LO 30 
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Co 	io 	io •o 	io •o CO 	io io 	6 6 
0- 0.. 0_ 	0_ 0_ 	Q.. 	0.. 0_ 	O.. O.. 	Q. 
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UTAS 
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22nd June, 2008 	
Private Bag 30 Hobart 
Tasmania Australia 7001 
Phone (03) 6226 2237 
Fax (03)6226 2883 
SCHOOL 	OF PCYCHOLOCY 
Mock juror's assessment of infanticide and insanity 
Peter Ball (Chief Investigator, School of Psychology) 
Heidi Gordon (Student Investigator) 
We would like to invite your participation to investigate people's thinking about 
women who are charged with the murder of their child. This research project is 
being undertaken as part of Heidi Gordon's Masters Degree in Clinical 
Psychology. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the decision-making process when 
jurors deliberate about a mothers' innocence/guilt, when charged with the murder 
of her child. Participation involves completing a questionnaire package. You will 
also be asked to read a short account of a fictional case (based on a number of 
actual cases) concerning a mother and the death of her child. You will be asked 
to record a verdict regarding the defendant's innocence/guilt and perceptions of 
postpartum illnesses following childbirth. It is estimated that all this should take 
approximately 30 minutes. 
It is important to understand that your involvement in this study is voluntary. 
While we would be pleased to have you participate, we respect your right to 
decline. There will be no adverse consequences to you if you decide not to 
participate. If you decide to discontinue participation at any time, you may do so 
without providing an explanation. All information will be treated in a 
confidential manner and as the questionnaires are completed anonymously, it 
will not be possible to use your name in any publication arising out of the 
research. All of the research will be kept in lockable storage in the School of 
Psychology at the University of Tasmania, for a period of at least five years, as 
required by the National Health and Medical Research Council. 
There are no foreseeable risks anticipated with participation in this study. Should 
you have any concerns or questions you are able to contact the researchers. If 
you would like to discuss any aspect of this study, please feel free to contact the 
researchers. We will be happy to discuss any aspect of the research with you. 
Once we have analysed the information obtained, a summary of our findings will 
be made available on request, after the 30 th November, 2009. You are welcome 
to contact us at that time to discuss any issue relating to the research study. 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study you should contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) 
Network on (03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au . The Executive 
109 
Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. 
You will need to quote H10193. 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. Your consent to participate 
will be indicated simply by returning a complete questionnaire package. This 
information sheet is for you to keep. 
Peter Ball (Chief Investigator): P.Ballic4utas.edu.au  
Heidi Gordon (Student Investigator): hdgordon utas.edu.au 
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Appendix C: SPSS Data Output 
Factor Analysis 
KM0 and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .913 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 	Approx. Chi-Souare 3011.325 
df 171 
Sig. .000 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadinas 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
% of Cumulative 'Yo of Cumulative % of Cumulative 
Factor Total Variance % Total Variance % Total Variance % 
1 6.246 32.872 32.872 5.711 30.059 30.059 3.913 20.593 20.593 
2 2.550 13.422 46.294 2.002 10.537 40.596 3.801 20.003 40.596 
3 .995 5.237 51.531 
4 .985 5.183 56.714 
5 .897 4.720 61.435 
6 .858 4.518 65.952 
7 .742 3.907 69.860 
8 .715 3.765 73.625 
9 .665 3.501 77.126 
10 .624 3.284 80.410 
11 .575 3.028 83.438 
12 .487 2.566 86.003 
13 .470 2.474 88.478 
14 .437 2.297 90.775 
15 .390 2.051 92.826 
16 .383 2.014 94.840 
17 .369 1.945 96.785 
18 .325 1.709 98.494 
19 .286 1.506 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Scree Plot 
6- 
2- 
= 
3 
0- 
1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 	1 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 	8 	9 	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Factor Number 
Factor Matrixa 
Factor 
1 
	
2 
	
1.1 	 .585 	-.341 
1.2 	 .489 	.258 
1.3 	-.296 	.229 
1.4 	 .472 	-.269 
1.5 	-.409 	.297 
1.6 	 .627 	.216 
1.7 	-.291 	.263 
1.8 	 .665 	.209 
1.9 	 .711 	-.225 
1.10 	.513 	.509 
1.11 	.771 	-.251 
1.12 	.492 	.563 
1.13 	.682 	.297 
1.14 	.651 	-.408 
1.15 	-.480 	.312 
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-.388 
-.502 
.489 
.605 
-.149 
.387 
.176 
.448 
   
Extraction Method: Principal Axis 
Factoring. 
a. 2 factors extracted. 5 iterations 
required. 
Rotated Factor Matrixa 
Factor 
1 2 
1.1 .182 .652 
1.2 .530 .155 
1.3 -.053 -.371 
1.4 .151 .522 
1.5 -.087 -.498 
1.6 .600 .282 
1.7 -.025 -.392 
1.8 .623 .313 
1.9 .353 .657 
1.10 .723 -.008 
1.11 .378 .717 
1.12 .745 -.062 
1.13 .697 .262 
1.14 .183 .746 
1.15 -.128 -.558 
1.16 -.382 -.163 
1.17 -.090 -.627 
1.18 .474 .214 
1.19 .746 .100 
Extraction Method: P incipal Axis 
Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. 
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Rotated Factor Matrix a 
Factor 
1 2 
1.1 .182 .652 
1.2 .530 .155 
1.3 -.053 -.371 
1.4 .151 .522 
1.5 -.087 -.498 
1.6 .600 .282 
1.7 -.025 -.392 
1.8 .623 .313 
1.9 .353 .657 
1.10 .723 -.008 
1.11 .378 .717 
1.12 .745 -.062 
1.13 .697 .262 
1.14 .183 .746 
1.15 -.128 -.558 
1.16 -.382 -.163 
1.17 -.090 -.627 
1.18 .474 .214 
1.19 .746 .100 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis 
Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 
iterations. 
M-C SDS Scores 
Descriptives 
SocDes score 
Std. Std. 95% Confidence Interval 
N Mean Deviation Error for Mean Minimum Maximum 
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Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
female 333 15.91 5.454 .299 15.33 16.50 4 32 
male 101 14.20 5.004 .498 13.21 15.19 3 29 
Total 434 15.51 5.396 .259 15.00 16.02 3 32 
ANOVA 
SocDes score 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
227.903 
12378.514 
12606.417 
1 
432 
433 
227.903 
28.654 
7.954 .005 
IDA-R 
Descriptives 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Total 	female 333 58.245 7.5943 .4162 57.426 59.063 37.0 78.0 
male 101 58.584 7.3147 .7278 57.140 60.028 40.0 76.0 
Total 434 58.324 7.5232 .3611 57.614 59.034 37.0 78.0 
lnj &amp; 	female 333 27.980 5.7490 .3150 27.361 28.600 12.0 42.0 
dan 	male 101 28.079 5.8850 .5856 26.917 29.241 14.0 44.0 
Total 434 28.003 5.7743 .2772 27.459 28.548 12.0 44.0 
Str 	female 333 30.264 3.2465 .1779 29.914 30.614 21.0 41.0 
Liability 	male 101 30.505 3.4860 .3469 29.817 31.193 20.0 39.0 
Total 434 30.320 3.3013 .1585 30.009 30.632 20.0 41.0 
ANOVA 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Total Between Grou DS 8.928 1 8.928 .157 .692 
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Within Grams 
Total 
24498.338 
24507.266 
432 
433 
56 709 
Inj &amp; dan 	Between Groups .755 1 .755 .023 .881 
Within Grams 14436.489 432 33.418 
Total 14437.245 433 
Str Liability 	Between Groups 4.489 1 4.489 .411 .522 
Within Groups 4714 492 432 10.913 
Total 4718.982 433 
Log-linear 
Data Information 
N 
Cases Valid 432 
Out of Ranaea 0 
Missina 1 
Weighted Valid 432 
Categories Illness 2 
Trans/reoc 2 
Law 3 
I nstruc 2 
hiah/ low idar 2 
verdict2 3 
a. Cases rejected because of out of range 
factor values. 
Cell Counts and Residuals 
Trans/reo 
Illness 	c Law 
high 
Instru / low verdict 
c 	idar 	2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count % 
Depressio Transient 
n 
Infanticide yes high 	inf, ins, 
>60 	ri 
9.500 2.2 
% 
9.500 2.2 
% 
.000 .000 
murder 1 500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
high 
Trans/reo 	lnstru / low verdict 
Illness 	c 	Law 	c 	idar 2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count % 
Depressio Transient 	Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
n 	 >60n 
9.500 2.2 
yo 
9.500 2.2 
% 
.000 .000 
murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % ok 
0 	murder 2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
no 	high 	inf, ins, 2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
>60 	ri 
murder 2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 000 
not 
auiltv 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 8.500 2.0 8.500 2.0 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri cyo % 
0 	murder 5.500 1.3 5.500 1.3 .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
Legal 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
insanity 	>60 	ri 
murder 
1.500 
4.500 
.3% 
1.0 
1.500 
4.500 
.3% 
1.0 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
% % 
not 
auiltv 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
<=6 	r i ok ok 
0 	murder 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 
% 
.1% .500 
ox., 
.1% .000 .000 
no 	high 	inf, ins, 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
>60 	ri 
murder 3.500 .8% 3.500 .8% .000 .000 
not 
ouiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
high 
Trans/reo 	Instru / low verdict 
Illness 	c 	Law 	c 	idar 2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count % 
Depressio Transient 	Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
n 	 >60n 
9.500 2.2 
ok 
9.500 2.2 
ok 
.000 .000 
murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri cyo % 
0 	murder 9.500 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
% % 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
reformulate yes 	high inf, ins, 
d insanity 	>60 	ri 
murder 
.500 
6.500 
.1% 
1.5 
.500 
6.500 
.1% 
1.5 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 10.50 2.4 10.50 2.4 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri 0 % 0 % 
0 	murder 3.500 .8% 3.500 .8% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
no 	high inf, ins, 2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
>60 	ri 
murder 5.500 1.3 5.500 1.3 .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % % 
0 	murder 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
Reoccurin Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 9.500 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
9 	 >60 ri % % 
murder .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
high 
Trans/reo 	Instru / low verdict 
Illness 	c 	Law 	c 	idar 2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count % 
Depressio Transient 	Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
n 	 >60n 
9.500 2.2 
% 
9.500 2.2 
ok 
.000 .000 
murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 3% 000 .000 
not .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
()IAN 
low 	inf, ins, 9.500 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % % 
0 	murder .500 10/n  .500 .1% .000 .000 
not 
ouiltv 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
no 	high inf, ins, 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
>60 	ri % % 
murder .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	int ins, 9.500 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri °hi % 
0 	murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
not 
mak/ 
2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
Legal 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
insanity 	>60 	ri 
murder 
3.500 
2.500 
.8% 
.6% 
3.500 
2.500 
.8% 
.6% 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
not .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
°Obi 
low 	inf, ins, 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % % 
0 	murder 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
% % 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
no 	high 	inf, ins, 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
>60 	ri 
murder 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
% % 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
high 
Trans/reo 	lnstru flow verdict 
Illness 	c 	Law 	c 	idar 2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count % 
Depressio Transient 	Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
n 	 >60n 
9.500 2.2 
ok 
9.500 2.2 
% 
.000 .000 
murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
not 
aunty 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
<=6 	ri 
0 	murder 9.500 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
ok ok 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
reformulate yes 	high inf, ins, 
d insanity 	>60 	ri 
murder 
2.500 
4.500 
.6% 
1.0 
2.500 
4.500 
.6% 
1.0 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
ok ok 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri ok ok 
0 	murder 8.500 2.0 8.500 2.0 .000 .000 
% ok 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
no 	high inf, ins, .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
>60 	ri 
murder 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
ok % 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 5.500 1.3 5.500 1.3 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri ok ok 
0 	murder 8.500 2.0 8.500 2.0 .000 .000 
ok ok 
not 
guilty 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
Trans/reo 
Illness 	c Law 
high 
Instru / low verdict 
c 	idar 	2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count % 
Depressio Transient 
n 
Infanticide yes high inf, ins, 
>60 	ri 
9.500 2.2 
% 
9.500 2.2 
% 
.000 .000 
murder 1.500 3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
Psychosis Transient Infanticide yes high 	inf, ins, 7.500 1.7 7.500 1.7 .000 .000 
>60 	ri ok % 
murder 3.500 .8% 3.500 .8% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 5.500 1.3 5.500 1.3 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri ok ok 
0 	murder 2.500 6% 2.500 .6% .000 000 
not 
aunty 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
no high 	inf, ins, 5.500 1.3 5.500 1.3 .000 .000 
>60 	ri ok % 
murder 1.500 3% 1.500 .3% .000 000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 9.500 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % ok 
0 	murder .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
Legal 
insanity 
yes high 	inf, ins, 
>60 	ri 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
murder 2.500 6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
not 
utility 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 8.500 2.0 8.500 2.0 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % ok 
0 	murder 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
ok % 
not .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
011iltV 
no high 	inf, ins, 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
ri % ok 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
high 
Trans/reo 	Instru /10w verdict 
Illness 	c 	Law 	c 	idar 2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count % 
Depressio Transient 	Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
n 	 >60n 
9.500 2.2 
% 
9.500 2.2 
cyo 
.000 .000 
murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
>60 murder 7.500 1.7 7.500 1.7 .000 .000 
% % 
not 
ouiltv 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 5.500 1.3 5.500 1.3 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % ok 
0 	murder 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
not 
ouiltv 
.500 
oh, 
.1% .500 
% 
.1% .000 .000 
reformulate yes 	high inf, ins, 
d insanity 	>60 	ri 
murder 
3.500 
4.500 
.8% 
1.0 
3.500 
4.500 
.8% 
1.0 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
% % 
not .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
Quay 
low 	inf, ins, 9.500 , 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % oh, 
0 	murder 2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
no 	high 	inf, ins, 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
>60 	ri % % 
murder 3.500 .8% 3.500 .8% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 8.500 2.0 8.500 2.0 .000 .000 
<6n % % 
0 	murder 2.500 .6% 2.500 .6% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
Reoccurin Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
ri 
6.500 1.5 
% 
6.500 1.5 
% 
.000 .000 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
high 
Trans/reo 	lnstru / low verdict 
Illness 	c 	Law 	c 	idar 2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count % 
Depressio Transient 	Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
n 	 >60n 
9.500 2.2 
% 
9.500 2.2 
% 
.000 .000 
murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 3% .000 .000 
9 	 >60 murder .500 .1% .500 1% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 7.500 1.7 7.500 1.7 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % ok 
0 	murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 000 
not 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
°LAN 
no 	high 	inf, ins, 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
>60 	ri cyo % 
murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 9.500 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri % % 
0 	murder .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 000 
not 
auiltv 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
Legal 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
insanity 	>60 	ri 
murder 
3.500 
3.500 
.8% 
.8% 
3.500 
3.500 
.8% 
.8% 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 9.500 2.2 9.500 2.2 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri cyo % 
0 	murder 3.500 .8% 3.500 .8% .000 .000 
not 
may 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
no 	high inf, ins, 7.500 1.7 7.500 1.7 .000 .000 
>60 	ri % 0/0 
murder 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
% % 
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Cell Counts and Residuals 
high 
Trans/reo 	Instru / low verdict 
Illness 	c 	Law 	c 	idar 2 
Observed Expected 
Residual 
s 
Std. 
Residual 
s 
Count 
a % Count °A) 
Depressio Transient 	Infanticide 	yes 	high inf, ins, 
n 	 >60n 
9.500 2.2 
% 
9.500 2.2 
ok 
.000 .000 
murder 1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
not 
ouiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 8.500 2.0 8.500 2.0 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri cy. % 
0 	murder 3.500 .8% 3.500 .8% .000 .000 
not 
auilty 
1.500 .3% 1.500 .3% .000 .000 
reformulate yes 	high inf, ins, 
d insanity 	>60 	ri 
murder 
3.500 
3.500 
.8% 
.8% 
3.500 
3.500 
.8% 
.8% 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 11.50 2.7 11.50 2.7 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri 0 % 0 % 
0 	murder .500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
not 
ouiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
no 	high 	inf, ins, 3.500 .8% 3.500 .8% .000 .000 
>60 	ri 
murder 4.500 1.0 4.500 1.0 .000 .000 
cyo % 
not 
auiltv 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
low 	inf, ins, 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
<=6 	ri cyo ok 
0 	murder 6.500 1.5 6.500 1.5 .000 .000 
% °/n 
not 
guilty 
.500 .1% .500 .1% .000 .000 
a. For saturated models, .500 has been added to all observed cells. 
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Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
Chi-Square df Sig. 
Likelihood Ratio 
Pearson 
.000 
.000 
0 
0 
. 
. 
K-Way and Higher-Order Effects 
K df 
Likelihood Ratio Pearson 
Number of 
Iterations 
Chi- 
Square Sig. Chi-Square Sig. 
K-way and Higher 	1 143 506.104 .000 449.333 .000 0 
Order Effectsa 	2 135 207.490 000 188.161 .002 2 
3 109 99.947 .721 118.115 .259 5 
4 65 43.191 .983 39.485 .995 6 
5 24 14.043 .946 11.138 .988 5 
6 4 3.463 .484 2.447 .654 5 
K-way Effects b 	1 8 298.614 .000 261.172 .000 0 
2 26 107.542 .000 70.046 .000 0 
3 44 56.756 .094 78.630 .001 0 
4 41 29.148 .917 28.347 .933 0 
5 20 10.580 956 8.691 .986 0 
6 4 3.463 .484 2.447 .654 0 
df used for these tests have NOT been adjusted for structural or sampling zeros. Tests using 
these df may be conservative. 
a. Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero. 
b. Tests that k-way effects are zero. 
Partial Associations 
Effect df Partial Chi-Square Sig. 
Number of 
Iterations 
Illness*Transreoc*Law*Instruc*h 
ighlow 
2 2.279 .320 4 
Illness*Transreoc*Law*Instruc*v 
erdict2 
4 1.962 .743 6 
Illness*Transreoc*Law*highlow* 
verdict2 
4 .551 .968 5 
Illness*Transreocinstruc*highlo 
w*verdict2 
2 3.986 .136 3 
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Illness*Law*Instruc*highlow*ver 
dict2 
4 .715 .949 5 
Transreoc*Law*Instruc*highlow* 
verdict2 
4 .244 .993 6 
Illness*Transreoc*Law*Instruc 2 .543 .762 5 
Illness*Transreoc*Law*highlow 2 .066 .967 5 
Illness*Transreocinstruc*highlo 1 .948 .330 6 
Illness*Law*Instruc*highlow 2 2.236 .327 6 
Transreoc*Law*Instruc*highlow 2 3.661 .160 5 
Illness*Transreoc*Law*verdict2 4 4.671 .323 5 
Illness*Transreocinstruc*verdict 2 1.630 .443 5 
2 
Illness*Law*Instruc*verdict2 4 6.766 .149 4 
Transreoc*Law*Instruc*verdict2 4 1.606 .808 6 
Illness*Transreoc*highlow*verdi 
ct2 
2 .874 .646 5 
Illness*Law*highlow*verdict2 4 3.845 .427 5 
Transreoc*Law*highlow*verdict2 4 .625 .960 5 
Illnessinstruc*highlow*verdict2 2 .228 .892 6 
Transreocinstruc*highlow*verdi 
ct2 
2 .876 .645 5 
Law*Instruc*highlow*verdict2 4 7.058 .133 4 
Illness*Transreoc*Law 2 .549 .760 6 
Illness*Transreocinstruc 1 .047 .829 6 
Illness*Law*Instruc 2 2.638 .267 5 
Transreoc*Law*Instruc 2 .078 .962 6 
Illness*Transreoc*highlow 1 .739 .390 5 
Illness*Law*highlow 2 1.176 .555 5 
Transreoc*Law*highlow 2 3.124 .210 5 
Illnessinstruc*highlow 1 1.739 .187 5 
Transreoc*Instruc*highlow 1 .184 .668 5 
Law*Instruc*highlow 2 6.249 .044 5 
Illness*Transreoc*verdict2 2 .269 .874 5 
Illness*Law*verdict2 4 3.328 .505 5 
Transreoc*Law*verdict2 4 15.332 .004 5 
Illnessinstruc*verdict2 2 4.286 .117 5 
Transreoc*Instruc*verdict2 2 1.538 .463 
Law*Instruc*verdict2 4 .634 .959 
Illness*highlow*verdict2 2 2.653 .265 
Transreoc*highlow*verdict2 2 6.481 .039 
Law*highlow*verdict2 4 14.784 .005 
Instruc*highlow*verdict2 2 .555 .758 
Illness*Transreoc 1 .146 .703 
Illness*Law 2 5.805 .055 
Transreoc*Law 2 .504 .777 
Illness*Instruc 1 1.506 .220 
Transreocinstruc 1 .013 .908 
Law*Instruc 2 .283 .868 
Illness*highlow 1 3.685 .055 
Transreoc*highlow 1 .226 .635 
Law*highlow 2 5.119 .077 
Instruc*highlow 1 .066 .798 
Illness*verdict2 2 20.894 .000 
Transreoc*verdict2 2 1.023 .600 
Law*verdict2 4 72.366 .000 
Instruc*verdict2 2 7.062 .029 
highlow*verdict2 2 12.166 .002 
Illness 1 .037 .847 
Transreoc 1 .037 .847 
Law 2 .518 .772 
Instruc 1 .333 .564 
highlow 1 24.312 .000 
verdict2 2 273.376 .000 
Sex: IDA-R x Verdict 
Crosstabs 
Sex = female 
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Case Processing Summary' 
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Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
high/ low idar * Verdict 332 100.0% 0 .0% 332 100.0% 
a. Sex = female 
high/ low idar * Verdict Crosstabulation d 
Count 
Verdict 
Total Infanticide 
Reform 
Insanity Insanity Murder Not Guilty 
high/ low idar 	hich >60 
low <=60 
Total 
35 
49 
84 
15 
47 
62 
16 
35 
51 
54 
71 
125 
1 
9 
10 
121 
211 
332 
a. Sex = female 
Chi-Square Tests" 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.055a 4 .026 
Likelihood Ratio 11.912 4 .018 
Linear-by-Linear Association .031 1 .860 
N of Valid Cases 332 
a. 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 3.64. 
b. Sex = female 
Directional Measuresd 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Error-a 
Approx. 
T 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Nominal by 	Lambda 	Symmetric .000 .000 b b 
Nominal high/ low idar .000 .000 b • b 
Denencient 
Verdict Denencient 000 .000 b b• 
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Goodman and 	high/ low idar .033 .017 .026` 
Kruskal tau 	Dependent 
Verdict Dependent .009 .005 .022c 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero. 
c. Based on chi-square approximation 
d. Sex = female 
Symmetric Measures a 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 	Phi .182 .026 
Cramer's V .182 026 
Contingency Coefficient .180 .026 
N of Valid Cases 332 
a. Sex = female 
Sex = male 
Case Processing Summary a 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
high/ low idar* Verdict 101 100.0% 0 .0% 101 100.0% 
a. Sex = male 
high/ low idar* Verdict Crosstabulation a 
Count 
Verdict 
Total Infanticide 
Reform 
Insanity Insanity Murder Not Guilty 
high/ low idar 	high >60 
low <=60 
Total 
13 
12 
25 
4 
14 
18 
5 
13 
18 
20 
17 
37 
2 
1 
3 
44 
57 
101 
a. Sex = male 
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Chi-Square Tests" 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.190d 4 .085 
Likelihood Ratio 8.512 4 .075 
Linear-by-Linear Association .599 1 .439 
N of Valid Cases 101 
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 1.31. 
b. Sex = male 
Directional Measurese 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errord 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Nominal by 	Lambda 	Symmetric .046 .073 .621 .534 
Nominal high/ low idar .114 .173 .621 .534 
Dependent 
Verdict Denendent .000 000 C C• 
Goodman and 	high/ low idar .081 .052 •088d 
Kruskal tau 	Dependent 
Verdict Dependent .023 .016 .05e 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero. 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e. Sex = male 
Symmetric Measuresa 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Nominal 	Phi .285 .085 
Cramer's V .285 .085 
Contingency Coefficient .274 .085 
N of Valid Cases 101 
a. Sex = male 
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Sex: Illness x Verdict 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Sex 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
female Illness *Verdict 332 100.0% o .0% 332 100.0% 
male Illness *Verdict 101 100.0% o .0% 101 . 100.0% 
Illness *Verdict Crosstabulation 
Count 
Sex 
Verdict 
Total Infanticide 
Reform 
Insanity Insanity Murder Not Guilty 
female 	Illness 	Depression 46 22 16 81 5 170 
Psychosis 38 40 35 44 5 162 
Total 84 62 51 125 10 332 
male 	Illness 	Depression 11 9 8 19 2 49 
Psychosis 14 9 10 18 1 52 
Total 25 18 18 37 3 101 
Chi-Square Tests 
Sex Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
female 	Pearson Chi-Sguare 23.839a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 24.242 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.106 1 .078 
N of Valid Cases 332 
male 	Pearson Chi-Sauare .854b 4 .931 
Likelihood Ratio .861 4 .930 
Linear-by-Linear Association .420 1 .517 
N of Valid Cases 101 
a. 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.88. 
b. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.46. 
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Directional Measures 
Sex Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
female Nominal by 	Lambda 	Symmetric .100 .027 3.546 .000 
Nominal Illness .228 .058 3.546 .000 
Deoendent 
Verdict .000 .000 
.C . 0 
Dependent 
Goodman and 	Illness .072 .028 
•000d 
Kruskal tau 	Dependent 
Verdict .024 .010 
•000d 
Dependent 
male 	Nominal by 	Lambda 	Symmetric .018 .067 .263 .793 
Nominal Illness .041 .152 .263 .793 
Deoendent 
Verdict .000 .000 
c . •c 
Deoendent 
Goodman and 	Illness .008 .018 
•932d 
Kruskal tau 	Dependent 
Verdict .002 .005 
•952d 
Dependent 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero. 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
Symmetric Measures 
Sex Value Approx. Sig. 
female Nominal by Nominal Phi .268 .000 
Cramer's V .268 .000 
Continaencv Coefficient .259 .000 
N of Valid Cases 332 
male Nominal by Nominal Phi .092 .931 
Cramer's V .092 931 
Continciencv Coefficient .092 931 
N of Valid Cases 101 
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Psychological History x Law x Verdict 
Crosstabs 
Case Processing Summary 
Trans/reoc 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Transient Law * Verdict 214 100.0% 0 .0% 214 100.0% 
Reoccuring Law * Verdict 219 100.0% 0 .0% 219 100.0% 
Law* Verdict Crosstabulation 
Count 
Trans/reoc 
Verdict 
Total Infanticide 
Reform 
Insanity Insanity Murder 
Not 
Guilty 
Transient 	Law 	Infanticide 49 0 0 16 5 70 
Leaal insanity 0 0 30 39 2 71 
reformulated 
insanity 
0 44 0 29 0 73 
Total 49 44 30 84 7 214 
Reoccuring Law 	Infanticide 60 0 0 3 5 68 
Leaal insanity 0 0 39 36 1 76 
reformulated 
insanity 
0 36 0 39 0 75 
Total 60 36 39 78 6 219 
Chi-Square Tests 
Trans/reoc Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Transient 	Pearson Chi-Square 261.093a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 287.172 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 14.422 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 214 
Reoccurinq 	Pearson Chi-Square 310•826b 8 .000 
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Chi-Square Tests 
Trans/reoc Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Transient 	Pearson Chi-Square 261.093a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 287.172 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 14.422 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 214 
Likelihood Ratio 345.975 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 53.588 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 219 
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.29. 
b. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.86. 
Directional Measures 
Trans/reoc Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errora 
Approx. 
Tb 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Transient 	Nominal by 	Lambda 	Symmetric .524 .055 7.571 .000 
Nominal Law .667 .050 8.934 .000 
Denendent 
Verdict .369 .072 4.255 .000 
Denendent 
Goodman and 	Law .610 .015 .000c 
Kruskal tau 	Dependent 
Verdict .338 .033 .000c 
Dependent 
Reoccuring Nominal by 	Lambda 	Symmetric .574 .051 8.300 .000 
Nominal Law .720 .049 9.084 .000 
Denendent 
Verdict .426 .063 5.442 .000 
Denendent 
Goodman and 	Law .702 .013 .000` 
Kruskal tau 	Dependent 
Verdict .438 .027 .000c 
Dependent 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Based on chi-square approximation 
Symmetric Measures 
Trans/reoc Value Approx. Sig. 
Transient Nominal by Nominal Phi 1.105 .000 
Cramer's V 781 .000 
Continaencv Coefficient .741 .000 
N of Valid Cases 214 
Reoccuring Nominal by Nominal Phi 1.191 .000 
Cramer's V .842 .000 
Continoencv Coefficient .766 .000 
N of Valid Cases 219 
Psychological History x IDA-R x Verdict 
Crossta bs 
Case Processing Summary 
Trans/reoc 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Transient high/ low idar* 
Verdict 
214 100.0% 0 .0% 214 100.0% 
Reoccuring high/ low idar* 
Verdict 
219 100.0% 0 .0% 219 100.0% 
high/ low idar * Verdict Crosstabulation 
Count 
Trans/reoc 
Verdict 
Total Infanticide 
Reform 
Insanity Insanity Murder 
Not 
Guilty 
Transient 	high/ low 
idar 
Total 
high >60 
low 
<=60 
23 
26 
49 
11 
33 
44 
7 
23 
30 
41 
43 
84 
3 
4 
7 
85 
129 
214 
Reoccurinq high/ low high >60 25 8 14 33 0 80 
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high/ low idar Verdict Crosstabulation 
Count 
Trans/reoc 
Verdict 
Total Infanticide 
Reform 
Insanity Insanity Murder 
Not 
Guilty 
Transient high/ low 
idar 
Total 
high >60 
low 
<=60 
23 
35 
60 
11 
28 
36 
7 
25 
39 
41 
45 
78 
3 
6 
6 
85 
139 
219 
Chi-Square Tests 
Trans/reoc Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided) 
Transient 	Pearson Chi-Sguare 11.340a 4 .023 
Likelihood Ratio 11.767 4 .019 
Linear-bv-Linear Association .678 1 .410 
N of Valid Cases 214 
Reoccuring 	Pearson Chi-Sauare 8.444 ' 4 .077 
Likelihood Ratio 10.665 4 .031 
Linear-bv-Linear Association 010 1 922 
N of Valid Cases 219 
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.78. 
b. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.19. 
Directional Measures 
Trans/reoc Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Errora 
Approx. 
T 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Transient 	Nominal by Lambda Symmetric .000 .000 .b . b 
Nominal high/ low idar .000 .000 b • b 
Dependent 
Verdict .000 .000 .b b 
Denendent 
Goodman and high/ low idar .053 .029 .024` 
Dependent 
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Kruskal tau 	Verdict 
Dependent 
.017 .010 .006` 
Reoccuring Nominal by 	Lambda 	Symmetric .000 .000 •b 
b• 
Nominal high/ low idar .000 .000 .b b• 
Dependent 
Verdict .000 .000 •b . b 
Dependent 
Goodman and 	high/ low idar .039 .019 .078c 
Kruskal tau 	Dependent 
Verdict .007 .006 .165` 
Dependent 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero. 
c. Based on chi-square approximation 
Symmetric Measures 
Trans/reoc Value Approx. Sig. 
Transient Nominal by Nominal Phi .230 .023 
Cramer's V .230 .023 
Continoencv Coefficient .224 .023 
N of Valid Cases 214 
Reoccuring Nominal by Nominal Phi .196 .077 
Cramer's V .196 .077 
Continaencv Coefficient .193 .077 
N of Valid Cases 219 
Confidence x Instructions 
Oneway 
Descriptives 
Confidence 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Std. Std. Lower Upper 
N Mean Deviation Error Bound Bound Minimum Maximum 
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yes 210 6.714 2.0040 .1383 6.442 6.987 1.0 10.0 
no 223 6.603 1.9349 .1296 6.348 6.858 1.0 10.0 
Total 433 6.657 1.9672 .0945 6.471 6.843 1.0 10.0 
ANOVA 
Confidence 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
1.336 
1670.485 
1671.821 
1 
431 
432 
1.336 
3.876 
.345 .557 
Juror x confidence 
Univariate Analysis of Variance 
Warnings 
Post hoc tests are not performed for Instruc because there are fewer than three groups. 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
Instruc 	1 
2 
Yes 
No 
210 
223 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable:Confidence 
Instruc Mean Std. Deviation N 
yes 6.714 2.0040 210 
no 6.603 1.9349 223 
Total 6.657 1.9672 433 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances a 
Dependent Variable:Confidence 
138 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.112 1 431 .738 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + lnstruc 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
De endent Variable:Confidence 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1.3362 1 1.336 .345 .557 
Intercept 19181.244 1 19181.244 4948.932 .000 
lnstruc 1.336 1 1.336 .345 .557 
Error 1670.485 431 3.876 
Total 20860.750 433 
Corrected Total 1671.821 432 
a. R Squared = .001 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002) 
Estimated Marginal Means 
1. Grand Mean 
Dependent Variable:Confidence 
Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
6.659 .095 6.473 6.845 
2. Instruc 
De endent Variable:Confidence 
lnstruc Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
yes 
no 
6.714 
6.603 
.136 
.132 
6.447 
6.344 
6.981 
6.862 
Sex and sympathy 
Oneway 
139 
Descriptives 
- 95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Std. Std. Lower Upper 
N Mean Deviation Error Bound Bound Minimum Maximum 
Symp. 	female 332 5.878 2.3335 .1281 5.626 6.130 1.0 10.0 
D 	male 101 5.252 2.3255 .2314 4 793 5 712 1.0 10.0 
Total 433 5.732 2.3439 .1126 5.511 5.953 1.0 10.0 
Symp. 	female 332 9.16 1.500 .082 9.00 9.32 1 10 
V 	male 101 8.52 1.863 .185 8.16 8.89 4 10 
Total 433 9.01 1.613 .078 8.86 9.17 1 10 
ANOVA 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Symp. D 	Between Groups 30.302 1 30.302 5.574 .019 
Within Grouns 2343.121 431 5.436 
Total 2373.424 432 
Symp. V 	Between Groups 31.512 1 31.512 12.433 .000 
Within Gmuns 1092.405 431 2.535 
Total 1123.917 432 
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Appendix D: Breakdown of Participant Data 
Frequency and Percentage of Participants in Each Condition 
Postpartum Depression Postpartum Psychosis 
Code N % Code N % 
HIY 18 4.1 HIY 16 3.7 
HIN 20 4.6 HIN 16 3.7 
HLY 18 4.1 HLY 18 4.1 
HLN 17 3.9 HLN 23 5.3 
HRY 20 4.6 HRY 17 3.9 
HRN 19 4.4 HRN 19 4.4 
TIY 17 3.9 TIY 16 3.7 
TIN 19 4.4 TIN 17 3.9 
TLY 18 4.1 TLY 16 3.7 
TLN 17 3.9 TLN 20 4.6 
TRY 19 4.4 TRY 18 4.1 
TRN 17 3.9 TRN 19 4.4 
Key: 
H = Psychological History 	R = Reformulated Insanity 
T = Transient (no history) 	Y = Legal Instructions 
I = Infanticide 	 N = No Legal Instructions 
L = Legal Insanity 
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Frequency and Percentage of Participants with Children Living in Their 
Household 
Number of Children Frequency Percentage 
0 234 53.9 
1 68 15.7 
2 77 17.7 
3 40 9.2 
4+ 11 2.5 
Missing data 4 0.5 
Total 434 100 
Frequency and Percentage of Hours (On Average) Participants Reported in 
Contact with Children per Week 
Number of hours (on average) Frequency Percentage 
0 90 21 
1-2 103 24 
3-4 49 11 
5-6 34 8 
7-8 15 3 
9+ 142 33 
Missing data 1 0 
Total 434 100 
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Number and Frequency of Participants who have Served on a Jury Previously 
Served on a jury previously 
N % 
Yes 5 1.2 
No 425 97.9 
Missing Data 4 0.9 
Total 434 100 
Number and Frequency of Participants who have Experienced the Death of a 
Child under 7 Years of Age 
Experienced the death of a child 
N % 
Yes 82 18.9 
No 349 80.4 
Missing Data 3 0.7 
Total 434 100 
